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Articles 
FUNDAMENTAL UNFAIRNESS: IN RE GAULT AND THE ROAD 
NOT TAKEN 
ROBIN WALKER STERLING* 
ABSTRACT 
 The data are shocking and familiar.  A grossly disproportionate 
number of youth in the juvenile justice system are children of color, 
and black youth, at only sixteen percent of the population, are the 
group most overrepresented at every stage.  An African-American boy 
is nine times more likely to be detained for a drug offense as a white 
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boy charged with the exact same offense, and has a one in three 
chance of being sent to prison during his lifetime.  These statistics 
stand despite widespread acknowledgment that the overrepresenta-
tion of youth of color in the juvenile justice system cannot be ex-
plained by offense rates, which are static across racial and ethnic 
groups; arrest rates, which hover near an all-time low; or de-
mographics, which yield this pattern of overrepresentation even in 
states with very small populations of people of color. 
 The often overlooked history of the treatment of black system-
involved children begins to give these statistics dimension.  In its 
1967 decision, In re Gault, the Court gave youths in delinquency 
proceedings the right to counsel as an extension of Fourteenth 
Amendment fundamental fairness instead of applying the procedur-
al protections of the Bill of Rights.  The Gault Court did this be-
cause it failed to fold the realities of the treatment of system-involved 
black children into its calculus of the process due in juvenile delin-
quency proceedings. 
 In this way, Gault splintered juvenile justice reform off from the 
Civil Rights Movement.  The conventional narrative relates that the 
Civil Rights Movement demanded an end to racial discrimination 
in the criminal justice system, and that the Supreme Court respond-
ed with an array of constitutional protections that form the basis of 
our modern system of criminal procedure.  But curiously, the Court 
stopped short of extending these reforms to another area of the crimi-
nal justice system that leaders of the Civil Rights Movement believed 
required reform: the juvenile justice system.  Civil rights leaders un-
derstood the juvenile justice system as a symbol of racial subordina-
tion to be torn down, like public schools, voting discrimination, and 
segregated places of public accommodation. 
 This Article argues that if the Court had been more attentive to the 
disparate treatment of black children in the juvenile justice system, 
then it would have been more likely to root juvenile court protections 
in the Bill of Rights because the Court would have recognized the 
disparate treatment as a form of racism—the same kind of racism 
that the Court had been addressing in its criminal procedure reforms 
rooted in the Bill of Rights.  An example of the abiding effect of the 
Court’s jurisprudential miscalculation can be found in a compari-
son of the Court’s holdings in two cases that considered provision of 
the jury trial right.  In Duncan v. Louisiana, the Court extended 
the Sixth Amendment jury trial right to defendants in state criminal 
proceedings.  But in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, the Court held 
that juveniles do not have the right to a jury trial under the Four-
teenth Amendment. 
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 Gault’s great deficiency is that it erected a flawed prototype that al-
lowed future courts to turn a blind eye to race disparities in juvenile 
delinquency proceedings.  Replacing that prototype with a better one 
will not itself cure juvenile courts’ deficiencies, but it will create an 
institutional environment in which a wide range of players can 
work more effectively toward a wide range of cures for many of the 
problems. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On July 3, 1899 in Chicago, Illinois, the country’s first juvenile 
court heard its first case.1  Henry Campbell, an eleven-year-old boy, 
stood accused of larceny.2 White, poor, and, according to his tearful 
mother, a boy who was “not a ‘bad boy at heart’” but who had been 
“led into trouble by others,”3 Henry was exactly the kind of child that 
motivated the Child Savers, a group of Progressive reformers, to cam-
paign for the establishment of a separate juvenile system dedicated to 
rehabilitation instead of punishment.4  The Child Savers envisioned 
the juvenile judge as a child welfare expert who would, like a benevo-
lent, firm-handed parent, fashion individualized sentences to rehabili-
tate the wayward children who appeared before him.5  In Henry’s 
case, Judge Richard Tuthill, a Civil War veteran, was happy to oblige.  
After Henry’s mother spoke in his defense, the judge sent Henry to 
                                                        
 1.  OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, JUVENILE OFFENDERS 
AND VICTIMS: 2006 NATIONAL REPORT 93 (2006), available at http://www.ojjdp.gov/ 
ojstatbb/nr2006/downloads/NR2006.pdf; see also DAVID S. TANENHAUS, JUVENILE JUSTICE 
IN THE MAKING 23 (2004). 
 2.  TANENHAUS, supra note 1, at 23–24. 
 3.  Id. at 24. 
 4.  See id. at 24–25 (explaining that the judge in the Campbell case had discretion to 
order the boy into the custody of his grandmother rather than send him to a juvenile re-
formatory); GEOFF K. WARD, THE BLACK CHILD-SAVERS: RACIAL DEMOCRACY AND JUVENILE 
JUSTICE 77–78 (2012) (noting that Progressive Era reformers can be credited with develop-
ing the modern juvenile court, focused on preventing delinquency through rehabilita-
tion). 
 5.  WARD, supra note 4, at 78. 
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live with his grandmother in Rome, New York, where he could have a 
fresh start.6 
Fourteen-year-old James Robinson did not fare as well.  History 
does not reveal James’s crime, but it does reveal his punishment: In 
1902, the black teenager was leased to a Georgia plantation called 
Kinderlou.7  James’s sister Carrie Kinsey wrote a letter to President 
Theodore Roosevelt asking for the government’s assistance when lo-
cal authorities would not help her retrieve her brother.8  “Mr. Prassi-
dent,” wrote Mrs. Kinsey, “They wont let me have him. . . .  He hase 
not don nothing for them to have him in chanes so I rite to you for 
your help.”9 The nascent juvenile justice system contemplated starkly 
different treatment for white children and children of color, because 
the Child Savers’ vision did not include providing individualized re-
habilitative services for children of color.10  Simply put, black children 
were black before they were children, and therefore exempt from the 
presumption that they were amenable to rehabilitation.11  In 1903, 
just four years after Henry was sent to live with his grandmother, 
James was allowed to escape the plantation when the McRees, the 
family that owned Kinderlou, learned that the United States Depart-
ment of Justice was about to begin investigating allegations of “ex-
treme cruelty” at the plantation.12 
Half a century later, the Civil Rights Movement presented the 
promise of reconciling these differences so that black children ac-
                                                        
 6.  TANENHAUS, supra note 1, at 23–24.  
 7.  DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT OF 
BLACK AMERICANS FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II at 8, 252 (2008).  For an expla-
nation of convict leasing, see infra Section I.B.2. 
 8.  BLACKMON, supra note 7, at 8–9. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  See WARD, supra note 4, at 73–74 (noting that reformers focused on white children, 
and that black children remained subject to institutionalization with adults); NAT’L 
COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, AND JUSTICE FOR SOME: DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT 
OF YOUTH OF COLOR IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 1 (2007), available at http://www.nccd 
global.org/sites/default/files/publication_pdf/justice-for-some.pdf. 
 11.  See id. (explaining that reformation “for white children came first” and that black 
children were often incarcerated with adults). 
 12.  The conditions were indeed cruel: “The men slept each night in the same clothes 
they wore in the fields, on rotting mattresses infested with pests.  Many were chained to 
their beds.  Food was crude and minimal.  Punishment for the disobedient was to be 
strapped onto a log lying on their backs, while a guard spanked their bare feet with a plank 
of wood.”  BLACKMON, supra note 7, at 251–52. 
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cused of crime might receive the nuanced, benevolent attention that 
the juvenile justice system promised to white youth.13 The Supreme 
Court responded to the pressures of the Civil Rights Movement by ex-
tending, via the Due Process Clause, the protections of the Bill of 
Rights to all adult defendants in state criminal proceedings.14  But in 
In re Gault,15 the seminal case that gave youths in delinquency pro-
ceedings the right to counsel, the Court set juvenile court jurispru-
dence on a different path.  Instead of applying the procedural protec-
tions of the Bill of Rights, the Court extended juvenile delinquency 
respondents only Fourteenth Amendment due process protections.16 
In this way, Gault splintered juvenile justice reform off from the 
Civil Rights Movement.  An example of the abiding effect of the 
Court’s jurisprudential miscalculation can be found in a comparison 
of the Court’s holdings in two cases that considered provision of the 
jury trial right.  In Duncan v. Louisiana,17 the Court extended the Sixth 
Amendment jury trial right to defendants in state criminal proceed-
ings.18  But in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,19 the Court held that juveniles 
do not have the right to a jury trial under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.20  Commentators have attacked McKeiver since it was an-
nounced,21 criticizing it as “ripe for overruling,”22 and “suspect and 
                                                        
 13.  WARD, supra note 4, at 200. 
 14.  See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149–50  (1968) (incorporating the 
Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury to the states), Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 
(1964) (incorporating the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination to the 
states), Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (incorporating the Fourth Amendment 
Right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure to the states). 
 15.  387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 16.  Id. at 41. 
 17.  391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
 18.  Id. at 149–50. 
 19.  403 U.S. 528 (1971). 
 20.  Id. at 545. 
 21.  See, e.g., Jury Trials in Juvenile Proceedings, 85 HARV. L. REV. 113, 118 (1971) (calling 
the Court’s consideration of the jury’s role “incomplete,” and listing the “other functions” 
that a jury can “serve . . . in the juvenile process that cannot be subsumed under the fact-
finding rubric”); Orman W. Ketcham, McKeiver v. Pennsylvania: the Last Word on Juvenile 
Court Adjudications?, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 560, 568–701 (1972) (discussing the impact 
McKeiver may have on the juvenile justice system); Comment, Juvenile Right to Jury Trial—
Post McKeiver, 1971 WASH. U. L.Q. 605, 606 (1971) (discussing the possible “constitutional 
infirmities” of McKeiver); Note, McKeiver v. Pennsylvania: A Retreat in Juvenile Justice, 38 
BROOK. L. REV. 650, 651 (1972) (calling the McKeiver decision “unsound”).  In R.L.R. v. 
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outdated.”23  The critics have several grounds, including the Court’s 
anemic due process analysis,24 the tension between the denial of the 
juvenile jury trial right and the United States Supreme Court’s rulings 
in Apprendi v. New Jersey25 and its progeny, the increase in challenges to 
McKeiver’s continuing validity in light of recent procrustean punish-
ments for juvenile delinquents,26 and the re-examination of the scope 
                                                        
State, 487 P.2d 27 (Alaska, 1971), the Alaska Supreme Court rejected the Court’s holding 
in McKeiver and granted juvenile defendants the right to jury trial.  Id. at 35. 
 22. See Barry C. Feld, The Constitutional Tension Between Apprendi and McKeiver: Sentence 
Enhancements Based on Delinquency Convictions and the Quality of Justice in Juvenile Courts, 38 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1111, 1224 (2003) (stating that “[a]s every commentator and many 
courts have noted, McKeiver’s uncritical and out-dated plurality decision is ripe for overrul-
ing”); see also In re Javier A., 206 Cal. Rptr. 386, 424 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (commenting that 
the continued denial of the constitutional right to a jury trial in juvenile proceedings “is 
not just ripe for Supreme Court reconsideration, it is overripe”). 
 23.  See Steven A. Drizin & Greg Luloff, Are Juvenile Courts a Breeding Ground for Wrongful 
Convictions?, 34 N. KY. L. REV. 257, 306 (2007) (commenting that “[d]ecades of case law 
and studies on jury versus judicial factfinding make the McKeiver plurality opinion seem 
even more suspect and out-dated”). 
 24.  Some have gone so far as to suggest that juveniles should have the right to a jury 
trial in juvenile proceedings, that juvenile court should be abolished entirely because of 
the absence of the jury trial right, or that the juvenile court does not actually protect chil-
dren at all and that minors might see better outcomes and receive better protection in 
criminal court.  See Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal 
Order: The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1083, 1118–20 (1991) (stat-
ing that the juvenile courts should be abolished as the costs associated with the “procedur-
al informality” of juvenile court may be more harmful to children than if they face charges 
in criminal court); Katherine Hunt Federle, The Abolition of the Juvenile Court: A Proposal for 
the Preservation of Children’s Rights, 16 J. CONTEMP. L. 23, 49–50 (1990) (noting that children 
could receive more rights and protections in criminal court and still be eligible for treat-
ment and rehabilitation rather than punishment if the juvenile courts were abolished); 
Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 MINN. L. REV. 691, 723 (1991) (ar-
guing that the abolishment of the juvenile court would allow for criminal court proceed-
ings to provide minor defendants with the same protections as adult defendants). 
 25.  The Court’s decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), has been a cat-
alyst in the recent resurgence of interest in the juvenile jury trial right.  In Apprendi, the 
Court held that any fact that increases the penalty for a crime “[o]ther than the fact of a 
prior conviction” must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt and submitted to a jury.  Id. 
at 490.  Subsequent cases have held firm to this bright-line rule. 
 26.  These include, most notably, lifetime sex offender registration for juveniles adju-
dicated guilty of serious, often consensual, sex offenses.  See In re Richard A., 946 A.2d 204, 
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of the rehabilitative function of juvenile court proceedings attendant 
to the recent series of juvenile Eighth Amendment cases before the 
United States Supreme Court.27 But the problem is not McKeiver.  The 
problem is Gault. 
This Article will argue that Gault’s reliance on a fundamental 
fairness analysis based in Fourteenth Amendment due process analy-
sis, instead of on a fundamental rights analysis based in the Bill of 
                                                        
214 (R.I. 2008) (finding that “the nature of the juvenile-justice system is not significantly 
compromised by a sex-offender-registration requirement” and upholding Rhode Island’s 
Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act as constitutional as applied to 
juveniles, but cautioning that “perhaps the better rule with respect to juveniles would be to 
provide the trial justice with the discretion to determine whether a respondent who has 
reached twenty-one years of age should be required to register as a sex offender”); In re 
Jeremy P., 692 N.W.2d 311, 319 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that sex offender registra-
tion was not criminal punishment and, therefore, the respondent had no right to a jury 
trial under either the federal or Wisconsin state constitution); see In re Alva, 92 P.3d 311, 
325 (Cal. 2004) (noting that “[r]egistration has not historically been viewed as punish-
ment, imposes no direct disability or restraint beyond the inconvenience of compliance, 
and has a legitimate nonpenal objective” and that the incidental retributive effects of reg-
istration “are not sufficient to outweigh the statute’s regulatory nature”); People ex rel. J.T., 
13 P.3d 321, 323 (Colo. App. 2000) (holding that a juvenile respondent facing registration 
did not have the right to a jury trial because the statutory duty to register as a sex offender 
did not constitute criminal punishment).  Other punishments for juvenile delinquents in-
clude: potential enhancement of future criminal sentences, ineligibility for student loans, 
disqualification from public benefits, including housing and other assistance, and ineligi-
bility to enlist in the military. See Kristin Henning, Eroding Confidentiality in Delinquency Pro-
ceedings: Should Schools and Public Housing Authorities Be Notified?, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 520, 570 
(2004) (discussing examples of housing authorities that check juvenile records); Michael 
Pinard, The Logistical and Ethical Difficulties of Informing Juveniles About the Collateral Conse-
quences of Adjudications, 6 NEV. L.J. 1111, 1114–15 (2006); Robert E. Shepherd, Collateral 
Consequences of Juvenile Proceedings: Part II, 15 CRIM. JUST. 41, 41–42 (2000) (describing how 
juvenile adjudications negatively impact eligibility for military enlistment). 
 27.  See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012) (holding that mandatory life 
without the possibility of parole for those who were under eighteen at the commission of 
their crime violates the Eight Amendment); Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 
(2010) (holding that the imposition of life without the possibility of parole sentences in 
juvenile non-homicide cases violates the Eight Amendment); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 
551, 578 (2005) (holding that the execution of a juvenile offender younger than eighteen 
years of age at the time of the commission of a capital offense violates the Eight Amend-
ment). 
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Rights, was a critical misstep.28  This was a misstep rooted in the con-
ventional narrative depicting the juvenile justice system as a benevo-
lent vehicle for the rehabilitation of children.29  What this conven-
tional narrative overlooked was the starkly different experiences that 
children of color had in the juvenile justice system.30  The Court at-
tended only to the dominant narrative, which pertained to white chil-
dren.31  In so doing, and in failing to understand the unique position 
of children of color in the system, it further marginalized these con-
stituents.32  This misstep was the first of two points forming a straight 
line between the Child Savers’ story and Gault’s adoption of funda-
mental fairness.33  The Court’s attention to the dominant narrative 
split juvenile rights from the Court’s criminal procedure revolution.34  
This critical mistake would serve to perpetuate, rather than redress, 
the legacy of disparate treatment of black system-involved children.35 
Part I will briefly recount the Child Savers’ juvenile court origin 
story, and an alternate origin story focusing on the treatment of black 
children, who are the most disproportionately represented youth 
population in juvenile court.  Part II will discuss the United States Su-
preme Court’s reasoning in Gault and the divergent paths the Court 
took in criminal and juvenile cases during the Court’s due process 
revolution and the Civil Rights Movement.  Part III will juxtapose 
McKeiver and Duncan, to illustrate that Gault’s reliance on Fourteenth 
Amendment due process has allowed juvenile justice jurisprudence to 
take a back seat to adult criminal protections.  Part IV will conclude 
with a discussion of the world that Gault created, and how this legacy 
of discrimination continues to operate in modern-day juvenile court. 
I.  JUVENILE COURT: ORIGINS 
Examining the history of the juvenile court provides insight into 
the evolution of the doctrine upon which the modern-day juvenile 
court rests.  History reveals that the story of the Child Savers and their 
successful campaign for a separate juvenile court does not encompass 
                                                        
 28.  See infra Part IV. 
 29.  See infra Part I. 
 30.  See infra Part I. 
 31.  See infra Part I. 
 32.  See infra Part I. 
 33.  See infra Part II. 
 34.  See infra Part III. 
 35.  See infra Part IV. 
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the lowered expectations for and harsher treatment of black children 
accused of crimes.36  Given the history of how black children fared in 
the juvenile justice system, it is no wonder that a legacy of minority 
overrepresentation and disparate provision of services continues to 
vex the system today.37 
A.  The Child Savers and the Origins of the Juvenile Justice System 
The story of how the Child Savers campaigned for a specialized 
juvenile court is well known.38  The beginnings of the juvenile court 
movement can be traced to the 1822 Report on the Penitentiary Sys-
tem in the United States by the Society for the Prevention of Pauper-
ism.39  The Society was comprised of a group of Quaker reformers fo-
cused on “alleviat[ing] the suffering of the poor in their 
communities.”40  Targeting the areas of education and criminal jus-
tice, they established schools for “the poorer classes” and introduced 
reform legislation that reduced the number of capital offenses.41  The 
Society’s Report condemned the practice of incarcerating children 
with adults.42  The same group of reformers followed that first report 
with an 1823 report that “called for the rescue of children from a fu-
ture of crime and degradation.”43 
In response, in 1824 the New York legislature granted to the So-
ciety, now called the Society for the Reformation of Juvenile Delin-
quents, authority to build the New York House of Refuge, which 
                                                        
 36.  See infra Part I.A. 
 37.  See infra Part IV. 
 38.  For discussion on the Child Savers, see generally BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE 
AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE COURT (1999) ANTHONY M. PLATT, THE 
CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY 3 (1969) (discussing the “child savers” 
role in the creation of the juvenile court); GEOFF K. WARD, THE BLACK CHILD-SAVERS: 
RACIAL DEMOCRACY & JUVENILE JUSTICE 6 (2012) (discussing the Progressive Era’s “child 
saving movement” from the perspective of black juveniles); Barry C. Feld, The Transfor-
mation of the Juvenile Court, 75 MINN. L. REV. 691, 694–95 (1991) (discussing the “child-
savers” view of the juvenile court). 
 39.  Sanford Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187, 
1189 (1970). 
 40.  Id. at 1188–89. 
 41.  Id. at 1188. 
 42.  Id. at 1189. 
 43.  Id.  
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opened in 1825.44  Dubbed “the first great event in child welfare,”45 
the House of Refuge was the country’s first dedicated juvenile treat-
ment facility.  The House of Refuge “offer[ed] food, shelter, and edu-
cation to the homeless and destitute youth of New York, and . . . re-
mov[ed] juvenile offenders from the prison company of adult 
convicts.”46  The charter for the House of Refuge was clear that only 
“proper objects”—boys who were deemed salvageable—were to be 
admitted.47  The Society’s overarching goal was to save their young 
charges from a future of criminal involvement by diagnosing and cur-
ing symptoms of predelinquency.48  Considered more victims than of-
fenders, youth would be able to cast off the influence of their parents’ 
“indolen[t]”49 examples and armor their vulnerability to the caprice 
of the city by internalizing the Society’s counterexample of law-
abiding citizenship.50 
Enter the Child Savers. The Child Savers were a group of Pro-
gressive reformers who successfully advocated for the creation of the 
nation’s first separate juvenile court in Chicago, Illinois in 1899.51  
Motivated by enlightened ideals concerning the reconstruction of 
childhood, appalled by the treatment youths suffered in adult jails 
and prisons, and convinced that youth misbehavior could be diag-
nosed and treated as easily as physical pathology, the Child Savers led 
a crusade on behalf of wayward, indigent children.52  Reduced to its 
                                                        
 44.  Id. at 1187, 1189–90. 
 45.  Id. at 1187. 
 46.  Id. at 1189. 
 47.  Id. at 1190. 
 48.  Id. at 1190–91. 
 49.  Id. at 1189.  
 50.  Id. at 1190–91.  An 1823 report noted: 
Many of these are young people on whom the charge of crime cannot be fas-
tened, and whose only fault is, that they have no one on earth to take care of 
them, and that they are incapable of providing for themselves.  Hundreds, it is 
believed, thus circumstanced, eventually have recourse to petty thefts; or, if fe-
males, they descend to practices of infamy, in order to save themselves from the 
pinching assaults of cold and hunger. 
Id. at 1191 n.25 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 51.  See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 52.  See Ainsworth, supra note 24, at 1097–1101 (discussing Progressive ideology and its 
effect on the juvenile court movement). A similar movement caused a shift in criminal 
cases “from punishment as a localized practice to an enterprise that focused less on public 
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component parts, the Progressives’ “Rehabilitative Ideal” had three 
tenets: first, children are capable of rehabilitation; second, all that re-
habilitation requires is the proper intervention; and third, the appro-
priate goal of rehabilitation was for “[a]ll Americans . . . to become 
middle class Americans.”53  These “proper objects” of the Child Sav-
ers’ solicitous care and concern were generally understood to be poor 
white and European immigrant youths,54 who were able to take ad-
vantage of an unspoken “cross-class alliance” that prioritized their 
needs over those of black children.55  “North or South, the basic pat-
tern was that upper-middle-class, native stock, urban whites would try 
to reform poorer whites” to help them assimilate into American socie-
ty.56 
The Child Savers believed that youth misbehavior was the reflec-
tion of an “unwholesome environment, especially the baneful influ-
ence of squalid urban life,”57 and that the behavioral and social sci-
ences could correct misbehavior with suitable state intervention.58  In 
other words, if the child’s undisciplined home life was the ailment, 
then state intervention was the cure.  Accordingly, “[c]hildren who 
                                                        
spectacle and more on the internalization of discipline, order, and law-abidingness.” See 
Melissa Murray, Marriage as Punishment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 26 (2012).  In fact, the 
“warden’s role was analogized to that of a parent,” and “[i]n this way, the penitentiary pro-
vided a substitute for familial discipline when the family failed.”  Id. at 27–28. 
 53.  See Barry C. Feld, The Constitutional Tension Between Apprendi and McKeiver: Sen-
tence Enhancements Based on Delinquency Convictions and the Quality of Justice in Juvenile Courts, 
38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1111, 1137 n.76 (2003) (describing the “Rehabilitative Ideal” and 
the Progressives’ views on how behavior could be changed) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
 54.  See WARD, supra note 4, at 73 (noting that poor white and immigrant European 
youths had access to “early juvenile institutions” that “reflected racial privileges”).   
 55.  Id. at 73, 86 (stating that “[p]rior historical research stresses that poor and foreign-
born white youths were a primary target of early child-saving initiatives.  Most accounts 
overlook how this focus disguised the way in which racial privilege was based on a shared 
white or potentially white racial status, despite distinctions.”). 
 56.  Id. at 73. 
 57.  Ainsworth, supra note 24, at 1097; see also Tamar R. Birckhead, Delinquent by Reason 
of Poverty, 38 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 53, 62 (2012) (noting that “[f]or those within the 
House of Refuge movement, poverty and crime were virtually synonymous”).  
 58.  See Ainsworth, supra note 24, at 1097 (explaining that “[j]uvenile misbehavior was 
seen as merely the overt manifestation of underlying social pathology” and that “[w]ith 
proper diagnosis and treatment . . . social pathology was considered as susceptible to cure 
as physical ailments”). 
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violated the law were not to be regarded as criminals but as wards of 
the state who should receive nearly the same ‘care, custody, and disci-
pline’ as that given to neglected and dependent children.”59  Because 
of the Rehabilitative Ideal, the major “criminal justice reforms [of this 
period]—probation, parole, indeterminate sentences, and the juve-
nile court—-all emphasized open-ended, informal, and flexible poli-
cies”60 to reform offenders. 
From its inception, juvenile court was more of a social welfare 
agency than a court system.61  The Child Savers imagined the juvenile 
court as a separate, specialized court, in which the judge would ascer-
tain not whether the child was “guilty” or “innocent,” but “[w]hat is 
he, how has he become what he is, and what had best be done in his 
interest and in the interest of the state to save him from a downward 
career.”62  Using this information about the child’s background and 
virtually unfettered discretion, the judge, acting as the parent the un-
governable child needed,63 would fashion an individualized sentence 
aimed to rehabilitate the child.64  The entire hearing was geared to-
wards a successful disposition in the child’s best interests. 
Because the juvenile court’s aim was rehabilitation instead of 
punishment, generally, the juvenile court “shun[ned] the burden-
some formalities of criminal procedures.”65  In many jurisdictions, the 
criminal rules of evidence and procedure did not apply in juvenile 
court.66 Hearings were confidential.67  Records were sealed so that sys-
                                                        
 59.  Birckhead, supra note 57, at 64.  
 60.  Feld, Constitutional Tension, supra note 22, at 1137. 
 61.  In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1967) (describing how “[t]he child was to be ‘treat-
ed’ and ‘rehabilitated’” and that “the procedures, from apprehension through institution-
alization, were to be ‘clinical’ rather than punitive”). 
 62.  Julian Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 119–20 (1909).  Judge 
Mack’s article about the juvenile court is one of the most-cited law review articles pub-
lished in or before 1960.  Fred R. Shapiro & Michelle Pearse, The Most-Cited Law Review Ar-
ticles of All Time, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1483, 1497–98 (2012).  
 63.  See Mack, supra note 62, at 117 (explaining that the child needed “not so much the 
power, as the friendly interest of the state”); see also WARD, supra note 4, at 78 (noting that 
a judge in Cook County, Illinois described the separate juvenile court as acting as a “kind 
and just parent ought to treat his children”).  
 64.  Ainsworth, supra note 24, at 1099.  
 65.  James E. Starrs, A Sense of Irony in Southern Juvenile Courts, 1 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
129, 134 (1966). 
 66.  See Gault, 387 U.S. at 15 (explaining that, under the views of the early reformers, 
the “rules of criminal procedure were . . . altogether inapplicable” in juvenile court).  
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tem-involved youths could avoid the stigma of a criminal conviction.68  
In most jurisdictions, children were tried by judges, and did not have 
the right to trial by jury.69  As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
opined, “[w]hether the child deserves to be saved by the state is no 
more a question for a jury than whether the father, if able to save it, 
ought to save it.”70  The informality was “deemed a part of the rehabil-
itative process.”71  The state derived its power to act from the doctrine 
of parens patriae,72 making the proceedings ostensibly informal, non-
adversarial and civil, instead of rigid, technical, harsh, and criminal.73 
The case of fourteen-year-old Thomas Majcheski, an example of 
one of the “poorer whites” who needed help assimilating into Ameri-
can society74 and an early case in Chicago’s new juvenile court, pre-
sents a typical example of the informal procedure and rehabilitative 
bent of juvenile court.75  In 1899, just a few weeks after Henry Camp-
bell’s case, Thomas was accused of stealing grain from a freight car in 
a railroad yard.76  The arresting officer told the court that Thomas’s 
father was dead, that he had eight brothers and sisters, and that his 
mother, a washerwoman, could not leave work to come to court.  The 
officer also told the court that Thomas had committed similar thefts 
previously, but had never been arrested.  Thomas admitted he had 
stolen the grain.  The judge then turned to the people in the court-
room, who may have numbered as many as 300, and asked if they had 
anything to say about what should happen to Thomas.  The judge was 
                                                        
 67.  ANTHONY PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY 137–63 
(1977) (describing the philosophy behind the creation of juvenile court). 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Ainsworth, supra note 24, at 1100–01. 
 70.   Commonwealth v. Fisher, 62 A. 198, 200 (Pa. 1905). 
 71.  Ainsworth, supra note 24, at 1100.  
 72.  Literally, “parent of the country.”  For a discussion of the parens patriae doctrine 
and its applicability to family court proceedings, see Jyoti Nanda, Blind Discretion: Girls of 
Color and Delinquency in the Juvenile System, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1502, 1511–13 (2012). 
 73.  See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1967) (“The apparent rigidities, technicalities, 
and harshness which [the early reformers] observed in both substantive and procedural 
criminal law were therefore to be discarded.  The idea of crime and punishment was to be 
abandoned.  The child was to be ‘treated’ and ‘rehabilitated’ and the procedures, from 
apprehension through institutionalization, were to be ‘clinical’ rather than punitive.”). 
 74.  WARD, supra note 4, at 73. 
 75.   See TANNEHAUS, supra note 1, at 26–28 (giving an account of the Majcheski case).  
 76.  Id. at 27. 
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about to incarcerate Thomas in the state reformatory, where Thomas 
would “have [had] the benefit of schooling,” when a young man in 
the audience stood up and told the judge that the sentence was too 
harsh.  Accounts indicate that the young man took up Thomas’s 
cause, persuading the judge that Thomas was just trying to get food 
for his family.  The judge then asked the objector to take Thomas and 
help Thomas become a better citizen.  The young man agreed.  On 
the way out of the courtroom, a reporter asked the young man how 
he would help Thomas reform.  The young man said he was going to 
“[c]lean him up and get him some clothes and then take him to my 
mother.  She’ll know what to do with him.”77 
The absence of procedural protections, as in Thomas Majcheski’s 
case, over the years led juvenile court opponents to criticize the very 
discretion that the Progressives promoted.  For example, in 1927, 
Herbert Lou, borrowing a phrase from Dean Pound, asserted that 
“the powers of the Star Chamber were a bagatelle” compared to the 
broad discretion afforded to juvenile courts.78  In 1949, Paul Tappan 
impugned juvenile court practices that abrogated “the presumption 
of innocence, such as the dissemination of probation reports prior to 
adjudication.”79  In a 1961 law review article, Chester J. Antieau ar-
gued that children in juvenile court are entitled to the same constitu-
tional due process safeguards that protect adults in criminal proceed-
ings.80  In a 1966 law review article, James E. Starrs warned that 
“[i]nformality and compassion are not necessary running mates.  In 
the wrong hands or in the wrong place, the Juvenile Court might 
merely ‘clothe (its) naked villainy, with odd old ends stol’n of holy 
writ, [a]nd seem a saint when most (it) play(s) the devil.’”81  In that 
same year, the Harvard Law Review published an empirical study con-
cluding that “the rehabilitative ideal was either fundamentally flawed 
or imperfectly implemented.”82 
Despite these critiques, the idea of a separate juvenile court with 
the goal of rehabilitating ungovernable youths into law-abiding citi-
                                                        
 77.  Id. at 29. 
 78.  Birckhead, supra note 57, at 65; see also Matthew Beemsterboer, The Juvenile Court—
Benevolence in the Star Chamber, 50 J. CRIM. L.J. & CRIMINOLOGY. 464, 475 (1960) (arguing 
that the informality of the juvenile court “is merely a euphemism for the star chamber”). 
 79.  Birckhead, supra note 57, at 65–66. 
 80.  Chester J. Antieau, Constitutional Rights in Juvenile Court, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 387, 
414–15 (1961). 
 81.  Starrs, supra note 65, at 130 (citation omitted).  
 82.  Birckhead, supra note 57, at 66 (citation omitted) (quotation marks omitted). 
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zens proved very popular.83  By 1925, there was a juvenile court in all 
but two states, and countries in Europe, South America, and Asia had 
crafted laws based on the Illinois Juvenile Court Act.84 
B.  The Experience of Black Children: An Alternate Origin Story 
The treatment of black children accused of crime was vastly dif-
ferent.  The violence against black children in the antebellum 
South—convict leasing, Jim Crow juvenile justice and the racial dis-
crimination of the houses of refuge—all combine to paint a picture 
very different from that of the juvenile justice system the Child Savers 
championed.  Themes that dominate the history of system-involved 
black children—social control, disparate expectations and inadequate 
services—persist today.85  Just as importantly, examination of this his-
tory reveals how juvenile justice reform emerged as a critical symbolic 
battleground in the struggle for civil rights,86 and why the Court 
should have taken this struggle into account in its consideration of 
whether juvenile rights would be based in Fourteenth Amendment 
due process or in the Bill of Rights. 
                                                        
 83.  See Miriam Stohs, Racism in the Juvenile Justice System: A Critical Perspective, 2 
WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 97, 99 (2003) (noting that all states had established a 
separate juvenile justice system, based upon the Illinois juvenile system, by 1945). 
 84.  Birckhead, supra note 57, at 64.  
 85.  Some important studies of the racial history of juvenile justice include: GEOFF K. 
WARD, THE BLACK CHILD-SAVERS: RACIAL DEMOCRACY AND JUVENILE JUSTICE (2012); WILEY 
BRITTON SANDERS, NEGRO CHILD WELFARE IN NORTH CAROLINA (1933); ANDREW 
BILLINGSLEY & JEANNE M. GIOVANNONI, CHILDREN OF THE STORM: BLACK CHILDREN AND 
AMERICAN CHILD WELFARE (1972); Alexander W. Pisciotta, Race, Sex and Rehabilitation: A 
Study of Differential Treatment in the Juvenile Reformatory, 1825–1900, 29 CRIME & 
DELINQUENCY 254 (1983).  For examples of histories written largely from the perspective 
of the majority racial group, see generally ANTHONY M. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE 
INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY (2d ed. 1977); DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE 
ASYLUM (1971); STEVEN L. SCHLOSSMAN, LOVE & THE AMERICAN DELINQUENT: THE 
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF “PROGRESSIVE” JUVENILE JUSTICE, 1825–1920 (1977); ROBERT M. 
MENNEL, THORNS & THISTLES: JUVENILE DELINQUENTS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1825–1940 
(1973); THOMAS J. BERNARD, THE CYCLE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE (1992). 
 86.  See WARD, supra note 4, at 72 (“For black civic leaders in the American South, ju-
venile justice reform was a forward-looking venture in black community reparation and 
freedom . . . .  The earliest black child-savers were greatly concerned with eventually en-
hancing the progress of black America through equal protection of black youths in rela-
tion to rehabilitative ideals.”). 
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1.  “No use trying to reform a Negro”87: Black Children in the Houses 
of Refuge 
Of course, when the Houses of Refuge were being built, slavery 
was legal and racism was freely expressed.  The Civil War was decades 
away; passage of the Thirteenth Amendment was even more remote.88  
Predictably, black children accused of crime in the South faced harsh, 
sometimes violent treatment, usually within slavery.  But even in the 
North, the belief that children were amenable to rehabilitation was 
reserved for white children.  In part because of the historical disre-
gard for the slave family, for many black civic leaders it was critically 
important to fulfill the promise of a juvenile court responsive to the 
needs of black children and families.89 
Houses of Refuge accommodated racist attitudes towards black 
children and their capabilities.  For example, it was clear that New 
York’s black children were not “proper objects” when the New York 
House of Refuge opened its doors in 1825, because the “colored” sec-
tion was not opened until 1834.  And, even when the New York House 
of Refuge established the “colored” section, black children were still 
excluded from rehabilitation services to avoid “a waste of resources 
and a debasement of [w]hites.”90  In a pattern that would be mim-
icked at the turn of the century with the spread of juvenile courts, 
other states followed suit, opening houses of refuge and allocating 
                                                        
 87.  DAVID M. OSHINSKY, “WORSE THAN SLAVERY”: PARCHMAN FARM AND THE ORDEAL 
OF JIM CROW JUSTICE 47 (1997). 
 88.  When the New York House of Refuge was founded in 1825, slavery was the law of 
the land.  Two cases are generally considered to be the Court’s most important pro-
nouncements on the subject of slavery during the antebellum period.  Both cases involved 
the treatment of slaves and their children.  In Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 608, 616–
18 (1842), the United States Supreme Court held that the federal Fugitive Slave Act pre-
empted a Pennsylvania state law that extended procedural protections to suspected es-
caped slaves.  In Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 406 (1857), the Court ruled that nei-
ther citizenship nor protection under the United States Constitution was available to Afri-
can slaves and their descendants.  The Court also held that Congress could not prohibit 
slavery in federal territories, and that slaves could not vindicate any rights in federal court.  
Id. at 449–50, 452. 
 89.  WARD, supra note 4, at 78. 
 90.  JAMES BELL & LAURA JOHN RIDOLFI, W. HAYWOOD BURNS INSTITUTE, ADORATION 
OF THE QUESTION: REFLECTIONS ON THE FAILURE TO REDUCE RACIAL & ETHNIC 
DISPARITIES IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM, 3 (2008), available at http://www.burns 
institute.org/downloads/BI%20Adoration%20of%20the%20Question_2.pdf. 
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fewer resources to black children.  The superintendent of the Phila-
delphia House of Refuge justified excluding black children from re-
habilitation programs because “[i]t would be degrading to the white 
children to associate them with beings given up to public scorn.”91  In 
Philadelphia’s House of Refuge,92 the “proper education” meant 
teaching black boys to perform manual labor, teaching black girls to 
be cooks, maids, and seamstresses, and steering all black children 
away from academic pursuits.93  In places that did not have separate 
black juvenile facilities, black youth were often placed in adult prisons 
instead of in white juvenile facilities with white youth.  For example, 
in 1850, in spite of the cities’ predominantly white populations, ap-
proximately 50% of youth under fifteen in the Providence, Rhode Is-
land, jail were black, 60% of youth at the Maryland penitentiary in 
Baltimore were black, and all youth in the Washington, D.C., peniten-
tiary were black.94 
Houses of refuge came late to the southern states; houses of ref-
uge for southern black children came even later.95  In the southern 
states, “[p]lantation discipline,” which included all manner of cor-
poral and other kinds of punishment, “took care of the disobedient 
Negro child.”96  Southerners simply did not think of a slave child ac-
cused of a crime “as a juvenile delinquent in need of special care;”97 
slaves were laborers who were taught “that theirs was a glorified place 
among the chickens and the pigs.”98  When a Mississippi legislator 
proposed a juvenile reform school in the late nineteenth century, as a 
compromise with opponents who did not want to squander resources 
on trying to rehabilitate black children because “it was no use trying 
to reform a Negro,”99 he “proposed that ‘schooling and moral instruc-
                                                        
 91.  MENNEL, supra note 85, at 17.  
 92.  In 1892, the black and white Philadelphia Houses of Refuge were moved to the 
Glen Mills Farm, which continues to operate as a residential home for system-involved 
youths today.  WARD, supra note 4, at 59; THE GLEN MILLS SCHOOLS, http://glenmills 
school.org (last visited Nov. 11, 2012). 
 93.  WARD, supra note 4, at 56.  In contrast, white boys “were trained as farmers and 
skilled artisans and provided with academic instruction.”  Id. 
 94.  LEONARD P. CURRY, THE FREE BLACK IN URBAN AMERICA, 1800–1850: THE SHADOW 
OF THE DREAM 115–16 (1981). 
 95.  WARD, supra note 4, at 62. 
 96.  MENNEL, supra note 85, at 75. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  BLACKMON, supra note 7, at 13. 
 99.  WARD, supra note 4, at 82–83. 
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tion’ be limited to the evenings, after ‘10 or twelve hours of work’ had 
been performed in the fields.”100  The first southern house of refuge, 
which opened its doors only to white boys, was built in New Orleans in 
1847.101  Maryland opened the first and only southern reformatory for 
black youths in 1873, almost fifty years after the New York House of 
Refuge opened its doors.102  Even in that instance, one of the main 
reasons for opening the Baltimore House of Reformation for Colored 
Children was “the need for agricultural labor through the state, as 
well as the great want of competent house servants.”103 
There were some studies that documented the early racial ine-
quality of juvenile courts.  In 1913, the Juvenile Protective Association 
of Chicago did a study of the boys in the county jail, and were “star-
tled” to find that “[a]lthough the colored people of Chicago approx-
imate one-fortieth of the entire population, . . . one-eighth of the boys 
and young men, and nearly one-third of the girls and young women, 
who had been confined in the jail during the year, were Negroes.”104  
In New York in 1925, the National Urban League did a study that re-
vealed that “[t]o an extent evidenced by probably no other group in 
the city, . . . the Negro finds himself with inadequate facilities in the 
recreation field and in the field of care of dependent and delinquent 
children.”105 
It should also be noted that the experiences of black youths in 
houses of refuge were anomalous, because most blacks still lived in 
the South during this time period,106 and where black children ac-
cused of crime faced far harsher, often violent, treatment, including 
convict leasing, whipping, and lynching.107 
                                                        
 100.  OSHINSKY, supra note 87, at 47.  The legislator’s bill would eventually fail.  Id. 
 101.  WARD, supra note 4, at 60. 
 102.  Id. at 60. 
 103.  Id. at 74.  At the House of Reformation, black boys learned “how to handle the 
hoe, shovel and spade; to manage horses, mules and cattle, to plow, to sow, and to reap,” 
and black girls learned “to scrub, wash, and iron, to bake and cook [and] to wait upon the 
family.”  Id.; see also Cecile P. Frey, The House of Refuge for Colored Children, 66 J. NEGRO HIST. 
10, 17–18 (1981) (noting that the Board of Managers of the House of Refuge for Colored 
Children in Philadelphia desired to send the black children to a small farm in the country 
so that they could learn agriculture and horticulture). 
 104.  WARD, supra note 4, at 111. 
 105.  Id. at 113–14. 
 106.  Id. at 83. 
 107.  Id. at 59, 67–68, 114–15. 
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2.  “One Dies, Get Another”108: Convict Leasing and Black Youths 
Convict leasing quickly emerged to fill the labor void left by the 
abolition of the “peculiar institution.”  Until the late 1920s and the 
Great Migration, 80% of black Americans lived in the South.109  To 
satisfy the South’s acute labor need, the criminal justice system was 
“retooled to provide cheap forced labor to mines, farms, timber 
camps, turpentine makers, railroad builders and entrepreneurs large 
and small.  Tens of thousands of men, the vast majority of them black, 
found themselves pulled back into slavery.”110  A common arrange-
ment might look like this: A business owner in need of labor might 
“ma[k]e up a list of some eighty negroes known to both [the sheriff 
and the business owner] as good husky fellows, capable of a fair day’s 
work,” give that list to the local sheriff, and promise the sheriff five 
dollars plus expenses for each man he arrested.111  Charges ranged 
from vagrancy, defined as not being able to prove employment, to 
more serious crimes.112  Terms ranged from a year and a day for bur-
glary to life imprisonment for murder.113 
Black children were swept up in this “convict labor machine”114 as 
easily as black adults were.  In 1868, of the 222 convicts in the Louisi-
ana penitentiary, forty-three were between the ages of ten and twenty 
years old.115  By 1880, at least 25% of Mississippi’s convicts were under 
the age of eighteen.116  By 1890, according to a census analysis by 
                                                        
 108.  LEON F. LITWACK, TROUBLE IN MIND 273 (1998); WARD, supra note 4, at 69; 
MATTHEW J. MANCINI, ONE DIES, GET ANOTHER: CONVICT LEASING IN THE AMERICAN 
SOUTH: 1866–1928 (1996). 
 109.  WARD, supra note 4, at 106. 
 110.  BLACKMON, supra note 7, at 7. 
 111.  OSHINSKY, supra note 87, at 71. 
 112.  BLACKMON, supra note 7, at 7.  
 113.  Id. at 327. 
 114.  OSHINSKY, supra note 87, at 46–48.  The convict leasing system persists.  As New 
York Times columnist Charles M. Blow discussed in his eight-part series about how Louisi-
ana’s private prison system thrives on high incarceration rates and harsh sentences, the 
convict leasing system is alive and well.  The series offered the following description of 
Louisiana’s private prison system: “A prison system that leased its convicts as plantation 
labor in the 1800s has come full circle and is again a nexus for profit.”  Charles M. Blow, 
Plantations, Prisons and Profits, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2012, at A21; Cindy Chang, How We Built 
the World’s Prison Capital, TIMES-PICAYUNE, May 13, 2012, at A-1.   
 115.  WARD, supra note 4, at 67. 
 116.  OSHINSKY, supra note 87, at 46–47.  
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W.E.B. Du Bois, more than 18% of all black prisoners were juve-
niles.117  The rolls of a slave mine in Birmingham, Alabama, list the 
death of a sixteen-year-old farmhand, sentenced to 729 days in the 
mines for “an unrecorded theft,” just before Thanksgiving of 1910.118  
No black child was too young to be incarcerated.  In the 1880s, the 
roster at Mississippi’s infamous Parchman Farm included six-year-old 
Mary Gay of Vicksburg, who was sentenced to thirty days incarceration 
plus court costs for stealing a hat.119  In 1901, it housed eight-year-old 
Will Evans, convicted and imprisoned for stealing some change from 
the counter of a dry goods store.120  The City of Memphis, at one 
point, held a four-year-old black child convicted of burglary.121 
3.  “The most effective way of handling delinquent Negro boys”122: The 
Effects of Jim Crow, Lynching, and Social Control on Black 
System-Involved Youths 
The juvenile court movement grew up under the watchful gaze of 
Jim Crow. Accordingly, “[r]ehabilitative efforts were often reserved 
for native-born and immigrant Anglo Americans in white-dominated 
juvenile court communities, where common European ancestry and 
white skin rendered them less threatening, distinctly ‘salvageable,’ 
and ultimately more assimilable—culturally, economically, and politi-
cally—than black and other nonwhite youth.”123 
Black children were overrepresented in juvenile court proceed-
ings, and underrepresented in rehabilitative agencies and services.124  
From the deep South to Chicago and New York, “white civic leaders 
                                                        
 117.  BELL & RIDOLFI, supra note 90, at 5.  Prison conditions were brutal.  A report by 
journalist Ida B. Wells on the convict leasing system revealed that starvation, disease, rape 
and whippings were common occurrences in prison.  IDA B. WELLS ET AL., THE REASON 
WHY THE COLORED AMERICAN IS NOT IN THE WORLD’S COLUMBIAN EXPOSITION 23–28 
(Robert W. Rydell ed., University of Illinois Press 1999) (1893).   
 118.  BLACKMON, supra note 7, at 328–29. 
 119.  OSHINSKY, supra note 87, at 47.  
 120.  Id. at 47–48.  Evans’ crime was listed as “grand larceny.”  Id.  
 121.  Florence Kelley, A Burglar Four Years Old in the Memphis Juvenile Court, 32 SURVEY 
318, 318–19 (1914); BELL & RIDOLFI, supra note 90, at 6. 
 122.  WARD, supra note 4, at 115. 
 123.  Geoff Ward, The “Other” Child Savers: Racial Politics of the Parental State, in THE 
CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY 225, 228 (Anthony M. Platt, Rutgers Uni-
versity Press 40th ed. 2009). 
 124.  BELL & RIDOLFI, supra note 90, at 6. 
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were similarly inclined to prioritize the provision of care and limit 
their influence to white youth . . . in segregated juvenile justice sys-
tems.”125  In the North, “this oppression typically manifested as institu-
tionalized neglect or subtle exploitation.”126  One chief probation of-
ficer in Illinois identified “the difficulty of providing adequate care 
for the dependent and neglected colored children” as “one of the 
greatest problems with which the court has to deal.”127  He went on to 
lay the problem at the feet of Jim Crow laws, explaining, “[t]he situa-
tion is complicated by a lack of resources in the community compara-
ble with those available for white children in the same circumstances.  
Practically no institutions are to be found in the community to which 
this group of children may be admitted.”128 
In the South, the oppression of the black youth population was 
overt and socially endorsed.129  In 1905, Arkansas governor Jeff Davis 
pressed for a reform school “where white boys might be taught some 
useful occupation and the negro boys compelled to work and support 
the institution while it is being done.”130  In 1914, Florence Kelley, di-
rector of the Chicago NAACP, sent W.E.B. Du Bois a photographic es-
say that documented the Jim Crow juvenile justice in Memphis.131  Kel-
ley wrote that “[t]he city of Memphis . . . gives its white juvenile 
offenders six teachers, and establishes their Juvenile Court in a beau-
tiful building once a school house,” with separate detention rooms for 
delinquent and dependent children, a gymnasium, a cottage, and a 
well-equipped shop for vocational training, while black children were 
afforded “a shabby six-room wooden cottage . . . badly equipped, 
[with just] its sewer connection in the back yard” and no teacher.132  
Memphis’s white juvenile court judge refused to serve the black juve-
nile court.133 
                                                        
 125.  WARD, supra note 4, at 228–29. 
 126.  Id. at 105. 
 127.  BELL & RIDOLFI, supra note 90, at 6. 
 128.  Id.  Around the time of the passage of the Illinois Juvenile Court Act, Jim Crow was 
the law of the land.  In Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896), the Supreme Court cre-
ated the “separate but equal” doctrine.  This doctrine would not be overturned until Brown 
v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 483 (1954), almost six decades later. 
 129.  WARD, supra note 4, at 105. 
 130.  Id. at 114. 
 131.  Id. at 234.  
 132.  Id. at 141 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 133.  WARD, supra note 4, at 234. 
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In addition to being denied their fair share of rehabilitative ser-
vices, corporal punishment, in the form of whippings, was reserved 
for black children.  For example, 159 youths in North Carolina’s ju-
venile justice system were whipped in 1933; 134, or over 80%, of 
them, were black.134  White North Carolina juvenile court judges pro-
fessed “a widespread feeling . . . that whipping is the most effective 
way of handling delinquent Negro boys.”135 
Like whippings, lynching was integral to social control in the Jim 
Crow era, and black children were not exempt from this terrorization.  
Well into the first half of the twentieth century, black youth were vic-
tims of extrajudicial mob executions.  In 1903, just four years after the 
juvenile court had come to Chicago, a mob murdered the sheriff of 
Scottsboro, Alabama when he refused to turn over a black teenager 
accused of “attempted criminal assault” against a nineteen-year-old 
white girl.136  After the mob killed the sheriff, it moved on to the 
youth, taking him from his cell and hanging him from a telephone 
pole.137  In 1908, a black teenager in Dallas, Texas, accused of raping a 
white woman was burned to death.138  In 1916, seventeen-year-old Jes-
se Washington was lynched and burned alive by a mob in Waco, Tex-
as.139  In his study of black life in a Mississippi Delta town in the 1930s, 
sociologist John Dollard found that the threat of lynching was ever-
present in the minds of even very young children.140 
                                                        
 134.  Id. at 115. 
 135.  Id.  
 136.  BLACKMON, supra note 7, at 234. 
 137.  Id. at 234. 
 138.  Id. at 324–25. 
 139.  BELL & RIDOLFI, supra note 90, at 6–7.  For a detailed recounting of this tragedy, 
see PATRICIA BERNSTEIN, THE FIRST WACO HORROR: THE LYNCHING OF JESSE WASHINGTON 
AND THE RISE OF THE NAACP (2006).  
 140.  PHILIP DRAY, AT THE HANDS OF PERSONS UNKNOWN: THE LYNCHING OF BLACK 
AMERICA 83 (2002).  It should be noted that black children were also executed by the 
state.  One famous case involved fifteen-year-old James Lewis and sixteen-year-old Charles 
Trudell, who were accused of robbery and murder of their employer, a white farmer.  
WARD, supra note 4, at 118.  They were convicted by an all-white jury and executed in 1947.  
Id. at 119.  The case triggered an international outcry against “juvenile murder” and “white 
justice.”  Id.  Pointing out that the boys would be too short to fit the electric chair, a news-
paper writer suggested that the boys be propped up on the United States Constitution, the 
Bible, The Age of Reason, and The Rise of Democracy, “so that Mississippi can destroy 
them all at the same time.”  Id. at 120.  Their federal appeals lawyer, Thurgood Marshall, 
compared them to the Scottsboro Boys.  Id. at 119–20. 
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Around the turn of the century, black civic leaders spearheaded 
their own child-saving movement.  Black leaders rejected this dispar-
ate treatment, as modern ideas of childhood and the import of chil-
dren as the center of the family and hope of the next generation141 
“combined with black liberation agendas, informed the development 
of a specific oppositional consciousness to Jim Crow juvenile jus-
tice.”142  The leadership was centered in the National Council of Col-
ored Women’s Clubs, which installed juvenile justice reform as a high 
priority at its first national meeting in 1898.143  These reformers 
worked on local levels “to establish largely voluntary self-help initia-
tives, including modest black reformatories across the South.”144 
Many facets of the black community were engaged in the pursuit 
of getting justice for system-involved black children.  For example, at 
the 1920 convention of Marcus Garvey’s United Negro Improvement 
Association, attendees endorsed a Declaration of Rights of the Negro 
Peoples of the World, which included juvenile justice reform as a 
means to lift the race.145  Article 44 stated: “We deplore and protest 
against the practice of confining juvenile prisoners in prisons with 
adults, . . . and we recommend that such youthful prisoners be taught 
gainful trades under humane supervision.”146  The NAACP, founded 
in 1909,147 consistently reported on juvenile justice issues in its period-
ical, The Crisis: A Record of the Dark Races, which sold nearly 100,000 
copies monthly by 1919.148  The Crisis featured prominent stories about 
a proposal for a reformatory for black children in North Carolina; the 
1912 execution of Virginia Christian, a sixteen-year-old black girl con-
victed of murdering her employer; and the 1912 conviction, in Mont-
gomery, Alabama, of sixteen-year-old Daisy Bell for fighting, and her 
sentence of a year and six months on a chain gang.149  In each of these 
instances, the newspaper offered coverage of the individual story as 
                                                        
 141.  WARD, supra note 4, at 230–31.  In a 1916 issue of Crisis, W.E.B. Du Bois stated that 
“in the hands of dark children lies the fate of the dark world.”  Id. at 231. 
 142.  Id. at 230–31. 
 143.  Id. at 235. 
 144.  Id. 
 145.   WARD, supra note 4, at 167–69. 
 146.  Id. at 169. 
 147.  NAACP: 100 Years of History, NAACP, http://www.naacp.org/pages/naacp-history 
(last visited Mar. 21, 2012). 
 148.  WARD, supra note 4, at 173.  According to historian David Levering Lewis, “[i]n 
middle class [black] families” at this time, The Crisis “lay next to the bible.”  Id. 
 149.  Id. at 173–74. 
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part of a larger narrative of injustice against black society.150  Several 
other civil rights organizations also took up the cause of juvenile jus-
tice, including the Joint Committee on Negro Child Study in New 
York City, which issued a report called A Study of the Delinquent and Ne-
glected Negro Children Before the New York City Children’s Court in 1927, 
and an interracial committee in North Carolina, which conducted a 
study of Jim Crow juvenile justice “to advance social change.”151 
4.  “Disproportionality” Documented: The Great Migration and the 
Treatment of Black Youth in Northern Courts 
As the United States gained prominence as an industrial power, 
cities sprinted to keep pace with the social problems attendant to rap-
id urban growth.  The eye of the juvenile court movement was initially 
centered in cities and coincided with the first wave of the “Great Mi-
gration.”  During the Great Migration, thousands of blacks from the 
rural South flooded Midwest, Western, and Northeast urban centers 
looking for industrial jobs.  The Great Migration “literally delivered 
thousands of black youth and families in need to newly established ju-
venile court jurisdictions, where they expected greater opportunity 
than was common in the South, yet still encountered exclusion on the 
basis of race.”152 
Detroit provides an instructive example. Juvenile court involve-
ment of African-American children, reflective of “a perceived lack of 
family structure and the difficulty of the transition from the rural 
South to the urban North,”153 was disproportionate from the earliest 
years of Detroit’s juvenile court.  Detroit’s juvenile court opened on 
July 25, 1907.154  Detroit’s black population grew rapidly in the first 
half of the twentieth century.  In 1910, Detroit’s black population was 
5,000, or 1.2% of Detroit’s population.  By 1920, it was 40,000, or 4% 
Of Detroit’s population.  Blacks made up almost 8% of the city’s pop-
ulation by 1930, 9% by 1940, 16% by 1950, and 29% by 1960.155  Simi-
larly, blacks were 3.3% of Pennsylvania’s population in 1920, but 
                                                        
 150.  Id. at 173, 175. 
 151.  Id. at 176–77. 
 152.  WARD, supra note 4, at 230. 
 153.  DAVID B. WOLCOTT, COPS AND KIDS: POLICING JUVENILE DELINQUENCY IN URBAN 
AMERICA, 1890–1940, at 98 (2005). 
 154.  Id. at 78. 
 155.  Id. at 97. 
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made up 30% of the mid-teens sent to prison,156 even though the of-
fense patterns for black and whites were very similar.157  The same pat-
terns can be found in other cities whose demographics changed in 
the Great Migration, including Chicago,158 New York159 and Washing-
ton, D.C.160 
Coeval with this change in the city’s racial demographics was the 
growth of the city’s police force, which expanded in size and in influ-
ence, but remained predominantly white.  Police officers were given 
broad discretion regarding referrals to juvenile justice systems, as 
their role transitioned from “community protection to crime suppres-
sion.”161  Subjective factors like the child’s attitude and cooperative-
ness became part of the arrest decision.162  In 1926, juvenile court 
complaints against black children were filed more than twice as often 
as such complaints were filed against white children.163  Although 
black children comprised only 3.3% of Detroit’s juvenile population 
in 1920, they comprised 12% of youths held in custody between 1917 
and 1928.164 
The phenomenon of “disproportionality” in juvenile courts was 
first identified on a national scale by researcher Mary Huff Diggs in 
the 1940s, towards the end of the Great Migration.165  Diggs reviewed 
fifty-three courts across the country.166  She found “that Negro chil-
dren are represented in a much larger proportion of the delinquency 
cases than they are in the general population. . . .  An appreciably 
larger percent of the Negro children came in contact with the courts 
                                                        
 156.  WARD, supra note 4, at 101. 
 157.  Id.  
 158.  WOLCOTT, supra note 153, at 118–19. 
 159.  WARD, supra note 4, at 113. 
 160.  WOLCOTT, supra note 153, at 162–63, 166. 
 161.  BELL & RIDOLFI, supra note 90, at 7; see also David B. Wolcott, “The Cop Will Get 
You”: The Police and Discretionary Juvenile Justice, 1890–1940, 35 J. SOC. HIST. 349, 356–57 
(2001) (“On the other hand, police departments professionalized themselves by downplay-
ing their traditional function of maintaining public order and instead devoting their pri-
mary efforts to efficiently fighting crime.”).  
 162.  BELL & RIDOLFI, supra note 90, at 7.  
 163.  See WOLCOTT, supra note 153, at 98. 
 164.  Id. 
 165.  BELL & RIDOLFI, supra note 90, at 8. 
 166.  Id.  
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at an earlier age than was true with the white children.”167  She further 
found that “[c]ases of Negro boys were less frequently dismissed than 
were white boys.  Besides, they were committed to an institution or re-
ferred to an agency or individual much more frequently than were 
white boys.”168 
II.  JUVENILE JURISPRUDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS: FUNDAMENTAL 
FAIRNESS VERSUS FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
In the latter half of the twentieth century, black children were in-
volved in the Civil Rights Movement along with adults.  Just as black 
leaders who were lynched or killed became powerful symbols in the 
Civil Rights Movement, so too were children who were lynched or 
killed adopted as important symbols of the fight for racial justice.169  
The brutal murder of fourteen-year-old Emmett Till in 1955 for whis-
tling suggestively at a white woman on a dare captured the world’s at-
tention because of his young age, “the innocence of his alleged of-
fense, . . . the fact that he was a Northerner killed in the South,” and 
his mother’s insistence on having an open casket at his funeral so that 
everyone could, in her words, “see what they did to my boy.”170  Youth 
also led the way in civil rights demonstrations,171 which spread across 
the South.172  For example, there were two such demonstrations in 
Mississippi: one in 1963 in Natchez, involving over 600 black youths 
and one in 1965 in Jackson, involving over 400 young people.173  In In 
                                                        
 167.  Id. 
 168.  Id.  
 169.  See DRAY, supra note 140, at 425 (recounting the murder of Emmett Till, a young 
black child, and stating that “Emmett Till’s [murder] was destined to be a very unquiet 
death”). 
 170.  See id., at 424–26 (“An estimated ten thousand people filed by the casket in the 
days before Till’s funeral. . . . People thousands of miles away wept upon seeing it.  [Em-
mett’s mother] Mamie Till Bradley herself said of the photograph’s disturbing power, ‘It 
just looked as though all the hatred and all the scorn [the world] ever had for a Negro was 
taken out on that child.’”).  
 171.  See Starrs, supra note 65, at 130–31 (“It has become a commonplace phenomenon 
of civil rights activity to find large numbers of children directly involved in all kinds of 
demonstrations.”). 
 172.  See id. at 133 (“Those perplexities in the use of the child demonstrator have ap-
peared on a broad front throughout the South.”). 
 173.  Id. at 133, 143–44.  Youths in these demonstrations faced heavy penalties.  Some of 
the young people participating in the Natchez demonstrations were incarcerated at the 
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re Burrus,174 the companion to the McKeiver case,175 black children 
charged with impeding traffic as part of a demonstration protesting 
school segregation asked for and were denied jury trials. 
A.  In re Gault and the Pyrrhic Victory of “Fundamental Fairness” over 
“Fundamental Rights” 
1.  The Supreme Court’s “Due Process Revolution”176 
Beginning in 1961, in the midst of the Civil Rights Movement, 
the “dominant theme” of the Court’s jurisprudence was racial equali-
ty.177  The Court was not immune to the zeitgeist that characterized 
this extraordinary time in the nation’s history.  Far from it—in word 
and deed, in civil and criminal cases, the Court disassembled the legal 
scaffolding of American apartheid, one indignity at a time.178  As Pro-
fessor Burt Neuborne argues,  
                                                        
Parchman State Penitentiary “where they were exposed to unimaginable indignities and 
cruelties.”  Id. 
 174.  167 S.E.2d 454 (N.C. Ct. App. 1969). 
 175.  In re Burrus will be discussed in depth in Part III, infra. 
 176.  Barry C. Feld, Race, Politics, and Juvenile Justice: The Warren Court and the Conservative 
“Backlash,” 87 MINN. L. REV. 1447, 1494 (2003) [hereinafter Feld, Race]. 
 177.  Robert M. Cover and T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism, 86 YALE L.J. 
1035, 1037 (1977); see also Feld, Race, supra note 176, at 1484, 1494 (discussing the Warren 
Court’s “perceived . . . need . . . to protect minority offenders” and desire to make its own 
contribution to the Civil Rights Movement by “focus on procedural rights” as an answer to 
the country’s profound “concern about racial inequality”). 
 178.  Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 333–34 (1968) (striking down racial segregation 
in prisons); Loving v. Virginia., 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (striking down laws banning interra-
cial marriage); Brown v. Louisiana., 383 U.S. 131, 143 (1966) (integrating public libraries); 
Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 401–02 (1964) (outlawing racial designations on the bal-
lot); Va. Bd. of Elections v. Hamm, 379 U.S. 19, 19 (1964) (banning separate voting and 
property tax records); Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61, 62 (1963) (prohibiting segregated 
courtrooms); Turner v. Memphis, 369 U.S. 350, 351, 354 (1962) (striking down segrega-
tion in airport restaurants); State Athletic Comm’n v. Dorsey, 359 U.S. 533, 533 (1959) 
(striking down laws banning interracial boxing); New Orleans City Park Improvement 
Ass’n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54, 54 (1958) (outlawing segregated parks and playgrounds); 
Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903, 903  (1956) (ending racial segregation in public transpor-
tation in Montgomery, Alabama and banning laws that required blacks to ride in the back 
of public buses); Mayor of Balt. v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877, 877 (1955) (banning segregated 
public beaches). 
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[the Court’s] concern over racial injustice and state institu-
tional failure was so intense during the . . . ‘Warren years’ 
that it played a significant role in shaping many of the most 
important constitutional decisions of the Supreme Court in 
areas as diverse as federalism; separation of powers; criminal 
law and procedure; freedom of speech, association, and reli-
gion; procedural due process of law; and democracy.179   
The Court’s concern over racial injustice is threaded throughout the 
fabric of the Court’s decisions.  For example, in Miranda v. Arizona,180 
Chief Justice Warren, in reference to an earlier case, “stressed the im-
pact of private interrogation” on “an indigent Los Angeles Negro who 
had dropped out of school in the sixth grade.”181  And, in Duncan v. 
Louisiana,182  the Court reversed an assault prosecution and bench-
trial conviction that “bore hallmark indicia of Jim Crow injustice.”183  
As the Court would proclaim in Green v. County School Board for New 
Kent County,184 the mission of the post-Brown cases was to eliminate 
race discrimination “root and branch.”185 
The steady introduction into adult criminal proceedings of the 
fundamental protections enumerated in the Bill of Rights was a cor-
nerstone of what has been called the Court’s “due process revolu-
tion.”186  The protections of the federal Fourth,187 Fifth,188 Sixth,189 and 
                                                        
 179.  Burt Neuborne, The Gravitational Pull of Race on the Warren Court, 2010 SUP. CT. 
REV. 59, 60. 
 180.  384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 181.  Cover and Aleinikoff, supra note 177, at 1037. 
 182.  391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
 183.  Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to Prose-
cute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1691–92 (2010).  For an in-depth discussion of Duncan, see 
Part III.A., infra.  
 184.  391 U.S. 430 (1968).  
 185.  Id. at 437–38.   
 186.  Sacha M. Coupet, What To Do With the Sheep in Wolf’s Clothing: The Role of Rhetoric 
and Reality About Other Offenders in the Constructive Dismantling of the Juvenile Justice System, 148 
U. PA. L. REV. 1303, 1304 n.8 (2000); see also Feld, Race, supra 176; Cover and Aleinikoff, 
supra note 177, at 1035–36 (stating that “[t]he innovations of the Warren Court in the area 
of criminal procedure constituted the most ambitious attempt in our constitutional history 
to illuminate th[e] dark underside” of the “Dickensian netherworld of mass criminal adju-
dication,” describing the criminal justice system as “a world steeped in the failings of hu-
man beings and the institutions created to control them,” and “reflect[ing] the place of 
the furies in the temple of Justice”).   
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Eighth Amendments190 were incorporated and applied to the states by 
way of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.191  
These protections included the Sixth Amendment when the Court 
found that “lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries,”192 
and extended the right to counsel to indigent adults charged with 
felonies in the landmark case of Gideon v. Wainwright.193 
Juvenile delinquency proceedings underwent a concomitant, but 
not coextensive, due process revolution.  Beginning with Kent v. Unit-
ed States194 in 1966, the Court began to limit discretion in juvenile 
court in the face of mounting evidence that the juvenile court exper-
iment was a failure.195  The most far-reaching of these cases was In re 
                                                        
 187.  See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961) (applying the Fourth Amend-
ment’s exclusionary rule for unlawful searches and seizures to the states by way of the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 188.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (holding that the government may 
not use statements stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant without first 
demonstrating the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against 
self-incrimination); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (extending the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against compelled self-incrimination to the states). 
 189.  Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 226 (1967) (incorporating the Sixth 
Amendment right to a speedy trial); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407–08 (1965) (incor-
porating the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 
492 (1964) (holding that suspects have the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment 
during the pre-indictment stage “when the [criminal] process shifts from investigatory to 
accusatory”); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342, 345 (1963) (incorporating the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel).  
 190.  See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (holding unconstitution-
al a state law that “inflict[ed] cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment”). 
 191.  See Martin Guggenheim & Randy Hertz, Reflections on Judges, Juries, and Justice: En-
suring the Fairness of Juvenile Delinquency Trials, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 553, 557 (1998) 
(“The issue in such cases was whether a particular guarantee of the Bill of Rights . . . 
should be extended to state court prosecutions via the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.”).  
 192.  Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344. 
 193.  Id. 
 194.  383 U.S. 541 (1966). 
 195.  Id. at 556; see also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 77 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (recognizing that “imposing . . . rigid procedural requirements . . . 
may . . . hamper enlightened development of the systems of juvenile courts”); In re Win-
ship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970) (determining that “the constitutional safeguard of proof 
  
2013] FUNDAMENTAL UNFAIRNESS 637 
Gault,196 which granted youths in delinquency proceedings the rights 
to counsel, notice, and confrontation, and the privilege against com-
pelled self-incrimination.197  Gault is commonly considered the juve-
nile analog to Gideon, but the two cases have one very important dif-
ference.  In contrast to its elevation of the “fundamental rights” as 
they are enumerated in the Bill of Rights in adult criminal proceed-
ings, the Gault Court installed Fourteenth Amendment “fundamental 
fairness” as the touchstone for analysis of the minimum due process 
protections required in juvenile proceedings.198  Although the Court 
declared that “whatever may be their precise impact, neither the 
Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone,”199 
Gault reserved the Bill of Rights for adult criminal defendants. 
2.  Fundamental Fairness Versus Fundamental Rights 
But Gideon was not the first adult criminal right-to-counsel case, 
and Gault was not the first Fourteenth Amendment right-to-counsel 
case.  Powell v. State of Alabama200 was a racially charged case in which 
three black men were accused of raping two white women.201  In Pow-
ell, the Court reversed the men’s capital convictions because the 
Court determined that the men had not received effective assistance 
of counsel.202  Unlike Gideon, in which the defendant represented 
himself, the Powell defendants had been assigned attorneys; in fact, 
                                                        
beyond a reasonable doubt is as much required during the adjudicatory stage of a delin-
quency proceeding as are those constitutional safeguards applied in Gault—notice of 
charges, right to counsel, the rights of confrontation and examination, and the privilege 
against self-incrimination).  For an in-depth discussion of these cases, see Part II.A, infra. 
 196.  387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 197.  Id. at 33, 41, 55–56. 
 198.  See Kent, 383 U.S. at 554 (holding that due process requirements apply to transfer 
proceedings); see Gault, 387 U.S. at 76 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (“[P]rudence and the principles of the Fourteenth Amendment alike require that 
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sure fundamental fairness . . . .”); see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970) (holding 
that fundamental fairness requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt in delinquency adju-
dications). 
 199.  Gault, 387 U.S. at 13. 
 200.  Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
 201.  Id. at 49.  
 202.  Id. at 58.  
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the court had assigned every attorney in the courtroom.203  The Court 
found that the defendants were entitled to effective assistance, in the 
form of counsel who would offer zealous representation instead of 
merely being present in the courtroom.204  Although Powell’s holding 
provided the defendant with effective assistance of counsel in a capital 
case, the Court took pains to note that the “United States by statute 
and every state in the Union by express provision of law, or by the de-
termination of its courts, make it the duty of the trial judge, where the 
accused is unable to employ counsel, to appoint counsel for him,” 
and that “[i]n most states the rule applies broadly to all criminal 
prosecutions.”205  Powell is important because the Court would later ex-
tend the right to counsel as a fundamental right pursuant to the Sixth 
Amendment in Gideon, despite Powell’s holding, which relied on Four-
teenth Amendment fundamental fairness.206  The progression from 
Powell to Gideon illustrates an instance in which the Court chose to 
augment Fourteenth Amendment due process protections as a vehicle 
for the provision of a critical right. 
Accordingly, when the Court was confronted with the issue of ex-
tending constitutional protections to children accused of crimes, it 
had two paths from which to choose.  One path was grounded in 
Fourteenth Amendment fundamental fairness; the other, in the pro-
tections found in the fundamental rights guaranteed in the Bill of 
Rights.  In In re Gault, the Court chose the former, and consigned the 
juvenile justice system to second-class status. 
The Gault Court’s reasoning presaged, in key ways, application of 
the Fourteenth Amendment due process balancing test that the Court 
would announce nine years later in Mathews v. Eldridge.207  In Mathews, 
                                                        
 203.  See id. at 59 (noting that “the trial judge, in response to a question, said that he 
had appointed all the members of the bar—for the purpose of arraigning the defendants 
and then of course anticipated that the members of the bar would continue to help the 
defendants if no counsel appeared”). 
 204.  See id. at 57–58 (stating that “during perhaps the most critical period of the pro-
ceedings against these defendants, that is to say, from the time of their arraignment until 
the beginning of their trial . . . the defendants did not have the  aid of counsel in any real 
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 205.  Id. at 73. 
 206.  See id. at 60 (“The question . . . is whether the denial of the assistance of counsel 
contravenes the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitu-
tion.”).  
 207.  424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
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an administrative law case that involved a due process challenge to the 
adequacy of the procedures provided to claimants whose Social Secu-
rity disability benefits have been terminated, the Court announced a 
three-part test for considering procedural due process claims.  Under 
the Mathews balancing test, a court must consider the following: First, 
the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, 
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the pro-
cedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substi-
tute procedural safeguards; and finally, the government’s interest, in-
cluding the function involved and the fiscal and administrative 
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement 
would entail.208 
The Mathews test is squarely grounded in Fourteenth Amend-
ment procedural due process.  And although it arose in an adminis-
trative law context, the Mathews test has since been employed as “a 
general approach for testing challenged state procedures under a due 
process claim.”209  Accordingly, this test has been applied in several 
contexts, including: Santosky v. Kramer,210 which adopted a clear and 
convincing evidence standard of proof in contested hearings for the 
termination of parental rights; Addington v. Texas,211  which set the 
standard of proof required for indefinite involuntary civil commit-
ment at clear and convincing evidence; and Schall v. Martin,212 which 
upheld the constitutionality of juvenile preventive detention. 
But not in the criminal context.213  There is no balancing of the 
equities for Bill of Rights protections.  Explaining that “the Mathews 
balancing test does not provide the appropriate framework for as-
sessing the validity of state procedural rules which . . . are part of the 
criminal process,”214 the Court has refrained from applying the 
Mathews test in criminal cases.  As recently as 1992 in Medina v. Cali-
fornia,215 the Court reaffirmed a long line of cases that held that the 
                                                        
 208.  Id. at 335. 
 209.  Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 599–600 (1979).  
 210.  455 U.S. 745 (1982). 
 211.  441 U.S. 418 (1979). 
 212.   467 U.S. 253 (1984). 
 213.  The Court has applied the Mathews test in two criminal cases, United States v. Rad-
datz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980), and Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), but in Medina states 
that it is not at all clear that the Mathews test was necessary to the holdings in those cases.  
Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 443 (1992). 
 214.  Medina, 505 U.S. at 443. 
 215.  505 U.S. 437 (1992). 
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application of the Due Process Clause to most criminal procedure is-
sues is measured by the specific, usually heightened protections of the 
relevant Bill of Rights guaranty.216  Or, as the Medina Court observed: 
The Bill of Rights speaks in explicit terms to many aspects of 
criminal procedure, and the expansion of those constitu-
tional guarantees under the open-ended rubric of the Due 
Process Clause invites undue interference with both consid-
ered legislative judgments and the careful balance that the 
Constitution strikes between liberty and order.217 
In other words, Medina demarcates a categorical distinction be-
tween the Bill-of-Rights-bound criminal procedure sector and the due-
process-bound remainder of the legal universe.  The application of 
the chameleon-like balancing test is a hallmark difference between a 
Bill of Rights fundamental rights analysis and a Fourteenth Amend-
ment fundamental fairness analysis.218  The categorical approach or-
dinarily results in criminal defendants enjoying greater protections 
than constitutional claimants in the rest of the universe.  In criminal 
cases, clad in the protections enumerated in the Bill of Rights, the 
Court does not try to divine what process is due, because the Bill of 
Rights prescribes it plainly enough. 
The language of these two lines of reasoning, Fourteenth 
Amendment fundamental fairness on the one hand and fundamental 
rights as they are enumerated in the Bill of Rights on the other, is very 
similar.  In one, the Court used a “fundamental rights” test; in the 
other, the Court observed the strictures of “fundamental fairness.”219  
In one, the Court granted that it would confer a right after finding 
that it was “essential for preventing miscarriages of justice and for as-
suring that fair trials are provided for all defendants;”220 in the other, 
the Court framed the inquiry as an evaluation of whether the right 
was one of “the essentials of due process and fair treatment.”221 
                                                        
 216.  Id. at 440, 442 (holding that a state statute requiring the defendant to prove her 
own incompetency by a preponderance of the evidence did not contravene due process). 
 217.  Id. at 443.  
 218.  See Mark Sblendorio, Note, Due Process-Fundamental Fairness, 27 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 735, 737–38 n.9 (1997) (“The second and distinct prong of fundamental fairness ad-
vocates that the Bill of Rights is distinct from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”). 
 219.  See supra text accompanying notes 15–16. 
 220.  Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157–58 (1967). 
 221.  Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562 (1967). 
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But the doctrinal foundations of these two lines of cases could 
not be more different.  Realizing “a vision of constitutional criminal 
procedure developed by the Framers of the Bill of Rights,”222 the 
“fundamental rights” cases were firmly anchored in rights that were 
already “well-defined in federal prosecutions.”223  The practical differ-
ences perhaps might seem inconsequential; for example, whether it is 
based in the Sixth Amendment or the Fourteenth, the right to coun-
sel requires the state to provide the accused a lawyer at the govern-
ment’s expense.  But the doctrinal difference between the Court’s 
treatment of adult criminal defendants and juvenile delinquency re-
spondents is profound. Constitutional protections for adult criminal 
defendants are affixed to the Bill of Rights, while protections for ju-
venile respondents seesaw on the Fourteenth Amendment’s due pro-
cess balancing test. 
For the Gault case, the guiding principle of the Court’s due pro-
cess balancing test consisted of weighing the protection afforded by a 
particular due process protection against its potential for jeopardizing 
the informality, flexibility, and efficiency of juvenile court hearings.224  
In other words, the due process calculus calibrated a balance between 
the system’s lack of due process protections and the rehabilitative ad-
vantages of the juvenile system.225  The more punitive the system, the 
Court reasoned, the more process it requires.  Subsequent juvenile 
cases would reaffirm this theme.226  But close examination of the Gault 
Court’s application of its nascent Fourteenth Amendment fundamen-
tal fairness balancing test reveals a glaring shortcoming endemic to 
                                                        
 222.  See Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 191, at 557.  
 223.  Id.  
 224.  See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1966) (“The problem is to ascertain the precise 
impact of the due process requirement upon such proceedings.”). 
 225.  See id. at 28–29 (recognizing that “[t]he traditional  ideas of Juvenile Court proce-
dure . . . contemplated that time would be available and care would be used to establish 
precisely what the juvenile did and why he did it—was it a prank of adolescence or a brutal 
act threatening serious consequences to himself or society unless corrected” and arguing 
that “[i]f he had been over 18 . . . the Constitution of the United States would guarantee 
him rights and protections with respect to arrest, search and seizure, and pretrial interro-
gation.”). 
 226.  Cf. Stephan E. Oestreicher Jr., Toward Fundamental Fairness in the Kangaroo Court-
room: The Due Process Case Against Statutes Presumptively Closing Juvenile Proceedings, 11 VAND. 
L. REV. 1751, 1767 (2001) (recognizing “the Court’s repeated emphasis on a juvenile’s loss 
of liberty highlights the crucial role that due process plays in the juvenile context” in cases 
following Gault). 
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balancing tests: all the factors of the Court’s due process test are sub-
jective, unquantifiable, and difficult to prioritize.227 
3.  In re Gault 
The facts of Gault were compelling.  On June 8, 1964, fifteen-
year-old Gerald Gault was accused of making lewd phone calls to his 
neighbor, arrested, and taken to a juvenile detention facility.228  Only 
after Mrs. Gault asked Gerald’s brother to look for Gerald did his fam-
ily learn that Gerald had been taken to the detention facility.229  Alt-
hough a petition was filed, neither Gerald nor his parents received a 
copy of the petition stating the allegations against him.230  The hear-
ing was held the next day in the judge’s chambers.231  The neighbor 
who reported the allegedly lewd telephone calls was not present.232  
No defense attorney was present.233  No record was made.234 No one 
was sworn in at the hearing.235  The judge questioned Gerald directly, 
and then Gerald was taken back to the detention facility.236  After an 
additional hearing,237 at which Gerald was again questioned by the ju-
venile court judge, Gerald was adjudicated delinquent and  commit-
ted to the State Industrial School “for the period of his minority”—in 
other words, for the next six years, until he reached twenty-one years 
old.238 
Handed down in the wake of Gideon, Gault stands as the Court’s 
clearest pronouncement on the process due to juveniles accused of 
crime.  Gault extended the right to counsel to juveniles in delinquen-
cy proceedings under the Due Process Clause of the United States 
                                                        
 227.  See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 
943, 944–45 (1987) (acknowledging the “serious problems in the mechanics” of balancing 
tests). 
 228.  Gault, 387 U.S. at 4, 5. 
 229.  Id. at 5.  
 230.  Id.  
 231.  Id. 
 232.  Id.  
 233.  See id. (listing the persons present as Gault, his mother, his brother, probation of-
ficers, and the judge). 
 234.  Id. at 5. 
 235.  Id. 
 236.  Id. at 5, 6.  
 237.  Id. at 6–7.  
 238.  Id. at 7–8. 
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Constitution.239  In addition to the right to counsel, Gault also extend-
ed to youth the right to notice of the charges against them, the right 
to confront adverse witnesses,240 and the Fifth Amendment’s privilege 
against compelled self-incrimination.241  Gault and its progeny af-
firmed that the Fourteenth Amendment required juvenile delinquen-
cy proceedings to comport with “the essentials of due process and fair 
treatment.”242 
The doctrinal foundation of the Gault decision circumscribed ju-
venile justice reform in the Court’s due process revolution and per-
petuated racial disparity in the juvenile justice system in a number of 
ways.  First, Gault, more than any previous case, grounded its reason-
ing in a discussion of the history of juvenile court, adopting wholesale 
the Child Savers’ origin story.243  The Gault opinion contains a sum-
mary of the history of juvenile court, starting with the 1899 Illinois Ju-
venile Court Act.244  The opinion recounts that reformers were “ap-
palled by adult procedures and penalties, and by the fact that 
children could be given long prison sentences and mixed in jails with 
hardened criminals” and were “profoundly convinced that society’s 
duty to the child could not be confined by the concept of justice 
alone.”245  The Court ratified the animating spirit of juvenile court, 
stating that juvenile court was built upon “the highest motives and 
most enlightened impulses.”246  In fact, this history omitted any recog-
nition of the disparate treatment of youths of color during a period 
when the Court’s cynosure was racial equality. 
Second, although the Gault Court, by its own description, “can-
didly appraised” the juvenile court and lambasted the juvenile court’s 
effectiveness,247 the fact that the Court stopped short of fully equating 
juvenile and criminal proceedings shows that the appraisal was not 
quite candid enough.  The Court recognized that “[t]he absence of 
substantive standards has not necessarily meant that children receive 
                                                        
 239.  Id. at 41.   
 240.  Id. at 33, 56–57. 
 241.  Id. at 55.   
 242.  Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562 (1967). 
 243.  See Gault, 387 U.S. at 14–15 (discussing the origins of the juvenile court system). 
 244.  Id. 
 245.  Id. at 15. 
 246.  Id. at 17. 
 247.  See id. at 21, 26 (suggesting that recent studies had “with surprising unanimity, en-
tered sharp dissent as to the validity” and effectiveness of the juvenile court system). 
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careful, compassionate, individualized treatment,”248 but it stopped 
there.  The Court listed recidivism statistics that showed that the sepa-
rate juvenile system had not significantly reduced juvenile crime.249  It 
cited sociological studies that found that “the appearance as well as 
the actuality of fairness, impartiality and orderliness—in short, the es-
sentials of due process”—might make more of an impact on a juvenile 
respondent than the “fatherly judge” and “benevolent and wise insti-
tutions of the State” conspiring “to save [the youth] from a downward 
career.”250  It is likely that the numbers the Court cited, if not the stud-
ies, implicated the racial demographics of juvenile court; but if they 
did, they did not do so explicitly. 
Third, Gault is notable because of its Janus-faced treatment of the 
Child Savers origin story.  On the one hand, the Court assailed the 
then-current juvenile system as a “kangaroo court,”251 and famously re-
iterated deep concern that youths in juvenile court were receiving 
“the worst of both worlds: . . . neither the protections accorded to 
adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated 
for children.”252  On the other hand, despite the Court’s full-throated 
rebuke, the Child Savers’ rehabilitation story remained critical to the 
Court’s determination that Fourteenth Amendment fundamental 
fairness, and not fundamental rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights, 
provides enough protection for youths accused in delinquency 
court.253  The Court rejected the idea of equivalency with criminal 
court, clung to the hope that the Child Savers’ original vision could 
be realized, and declared that the introduction of due process rights 
was a route to that goal.254 
Finally, in a preview of Mathews, the Gault Court balanced several 
factors as it created a new juvenile court.255  The Gault Court exam-
ined the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the child’s liberty interest 
through the juvenile court’s lack of procedures used by comparing 
                                                        
 248.  Id. at 18. 
 249.  Id. at 22. 
 250.  Id. at 26 (citation omitted). 
 251.  Id. at 28. 
 252.  Id. at 18 n.23 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); Kent v. Unit-
ed States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1967). 
 253.  See Gault, 387 U.S. at 29–30 (explaining how Gault would have been afforded 
more protections under constitutional due process than he was under the existing juvenile 
court system). 
 254.  Id. at 30–31. 
 255.  Id. at 29–30. 
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what happened in Gerald’s case to what would have happened if Ger-
ald had been an adult, to conclude that the risk of an erroneous dep-
rivation of Gerald’s liberty interest was too high without the right to 
counsel.256  The Court addressed whether addition of defense counsel 
and other procedural protections would derail the intimate, informal, 
rehabilitative vision of juvenile court, to conclude that it would not.257  
The Court considered the administrative cost of extending each pro-
posed protection to juvenile court, including consideration of what, if 
any, ancillary protections would have to be extended to support the 
due process protection at issue.258  The Court considered whether a 
particular proposed protection might remedy more than one short-
                                                        
 256.  Id.  The Court observed that if Gerald had been eighteen, and beyond the juvenile 
court’s jurisdiction, he would have faced a maximum punishment of a fine of $5 to $50, or 
imprisonment in jail for up to two months; he would have been entitled to the full panoply 
of constitutional rights, including the right to counsel, and protection against search and 
seizure, and pretrial interrogation; he would have received specific notice of the charges, 
and time and counsel to consider his goals for the case; and he would have had the right 
to confront the complainant on the record.  Id.  
 257.  Id. at 38 n.64 (citing Note, Rights and Rehabilitation in the Juvenile Courts, 67 COLUM. 
L. REV. 281, 324–327 (1967)).  The Court addressed this specific issue explicitly in a foot-
note, in which it cited a Columbia Law Review note for the proposition that “[r]ecognition 
of the right to counsel involves no necessary interference with the special purposes of ju-
venile court procedures; indeed, it seems that counsel can play an important role in the 
process of rehabilitation.”  Id.  The Court buttressed its position that the extension of the 
right to counsel would not impede juvenile court’s rehabilitative goals by remarking that, 
at the time the Court considered Gault’s case, the majority of state “court decisions, ex-
perts, . . . legislatures,” and court rules—a calculation which included at least one-third of 
the states—“ha[d] demonstrated increasing recognition” of the view that youths facing 
delinquency proceedings had the right to representation by retained counsel, notice of 
the right, assignment of counsel, or a combination of these.  Gault, 387 U.S. at 37–38 
(footnotes omitted).  With respect to the privilege against self-incrimination, the Court 
also took pains to note that the privilege against self-incrimination is “broader and deeper” 
than simple exclusion of confessions that may be unreliable because they are the product 
of coercion; a crucial purpose of the privilege “is to prevent the state, whether by force or 
by psychological domination, from overcoming the mind and will of the person under in-
vestigation and depriving him of the freedom to decide whether to assist the state in secur-
ing his conviction.”  Id. at 47. 
 258. See id. at 30 (explaining that juvenile proceedings need not conform to all the re-
quirements of an administrative or criminal trial, but mandating that “the essentials of due 
process and fair treatment” be provided).  
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coming of juvenile court.259  And, the Court discussed whether there 
was an adequate substitute for the right to counsel, to conclude that 
there was none.260  All these factors tipped the Gault Court’s scale in 
favor of extending the right to counsel pursuant to the Fourteenth 
Amendment.261 
Had the Court jettisoned the Child Savers’ origin story, it might 
have determined that juvenile delinquency proceedings were com-
pletely analogous to criminal trials, and applied to juvenile delin-
quency proceedings the same constitutional protections that check 
the government’s power in criminal proceedings.  Instead, the Court 
set out to map the “gossamer” contours of due process262 using the 
amorphous principle of Fourteenth Amendment fundamental fair-
ness as its compass.263  The Court’s goal was to import due process 
standards, so that the states would not have “to abandon or displace 
any of the substantive benefits of the juvenile process,”264 like confi-
dentiality and rehabilitative services.265  In this way, the Fourteenth 
Amendment fundamental fairness balancing test broke new ground, 
as a hybrid, quasi-criminal juvenile justice system sprang, fully formed, 
                                                        
 259.  See id. at 29–30 (implying that Gault’s trial might have gone differently had due 
process been observed, since many aspects—like the right to notice and the right to con-
front witnesses—would have come into play). 
 260.  Id. at 36 (stating “[t]he probation officer cannot act as counsel for the child.  His 
role . . . is as arresting officer and witness against the child.  Nor can the judge represent 
the child.”). 
 261.  Id. at 41. 
 262.  Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 602 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., joining in reversal of 
judgment). 
 263.  Gault, 387 U.S. at 19–20. 
 264.  Id. at 21. 
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tiality of records of police contacts and court action relating to juveniles.”); see also id. at 
27–28 (noting that given the deprivation of liberty at stake in a juvenile delinquency trial, 
“our Constitution . . . require[s] the procedural regularity and the exercise of care implied 
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of the adversary system [does not] require that the conception of the kindly juvenile judge 
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from the Court’s collective faith in the unrealized promise of the 
Child Savers’ origin story.266 
III.  MCKEIVER V. PENNSYLVANIA: THE RESULT OF GAULT’S MISSTEP 
In Gault, the Court reached the same result as it had in Gideon by 
a divergent doctrinal path.  The Court’s jury-trial-right jurisprudence 
provides an example of an instance in which fundamental fairness 
and fundamental rights led to different outcomes.  In 1968, in Duncan 
v. Louisiana,267 the Court held that state criminal defendants charged 
with felonies had a right to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment, 
applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.268  In stark 
contrast, consideration of the jury trial question stopped the momen-
tum of the juvenile procedural due process revolution in its tracks.  In 
1971, hewing faithfully to the Child Savers’ rehabilitative vision, the 
Court held, in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,269 that juveniles facing delin-
quency proceedings do not have a federal constitutional right to a ju-
ry trial under either the Sixth or Fourteenth Amendments.270  In this 
way, the two jury cases that the Court considered during this time il-
luminate the Court’s jurisprudential misstep. 
A.  Duncan v. Louisiana 
On May 20, 1968, a year after the Gault decision and just five 
months before the protests of appellants in In re Burrus, McKeiver’s 
companion case, the Court swept the Sixth Amendment right to a jury 
trial into its revolution.  In Duncan, the Court held that the Sixth 
Amendment right to trial by jury in serious criminal prosecutions was 
incorporated through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and applied to the states.271 
Nineteen-year-old Gary Duncan was charged with simple battery, 
a misdemeanor punishable by a maximum penalty of two years’ im-
                                                        
 266.  See Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 191, at 559 (“[T]he Gault Court cast itself 
loose of the Constitutional Framers’ vision of a code of criminal procedure and assumed 
the task of identifying the core components of a fundamentally just system of criminal 
prosecutions of youth.”). 
 267.  391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
 268.  Id. at 149. 
 269.  403 U.S. 528 (1971). 
 270.  Id. at 553. 
 271.  Id. at 157–58. 
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prisonment and a fine of $300.272  The incident “bore hallmark indicia 
of Jim Crow injustice.”273  Driving along Highway 23 in Plaquemines 
Parish, Duncan, who was black, saw two of his cousins involved in a 
“conversation by the side of the road with four white boys”274 and 
feared the worst because his cousins had told him about racial inci-
dents at the all-white high school to which they had recently trans-
ferred.275  While the trial testimony that Duncan encouraged his cous-
ins to “break off the encounter and enter his car” was uncontested, 
the facts of the assault were in dispute.276  The white witnesses testified 
that Duncan slapped the complainant, Herman Landry, on the elbow 
just before Duncan got back in his car, while the black witnesses testi-
fied that Duncan just touched Landry’s elbow.277  Duncan’s timely re-
quest for a jury trial was denied because the Louisiana constitution al-
lowed for jury trials only in cases where capital punishment or 
imprisonment at hard labor could be imposed.278  Duncan was con-
victed and sentenced to sixty days in jail and a fine of $150.279 
The Court applied the fundamental rights test and concluded 
that a jury trial is indeed a fundamental right, “essential for prevent-
ing miscarriages of justice and for assuring that fair trials are provided 
                                                        
 272.  Id. at 146–47. 
 273.  See Bowers, supra note 183, at 1692.  The opinion in Sobol v. Perez, 289 F. Supp. 392 
(E.D. La. 1968) provides additional context.  The Sobol opinion details the retaliatory pros-
ecution of Gary Duncan’s trial lawyer, Dick Sobol, by Leander Perez, Jr., the Plaquemines 
Parish District Attorney.  Sobol, 289 F. Supp. at 393.  Sobol was accused of practicing law 
without a license.  Id.  The court stated:  
The circumstances surrounding the arrest and charge against Sobol, and the 
course of the Duncan case, convince us that Sobol was prosecuted only because 
he was a civil rights lawyer forcefully representing a Negro in a case growing out 
of the desegregation of the Plaquemines Parish school system.  The attitude in 
this parish toward realization by Negroes of their civil rights is well known to this 
court. . . . District Attorney Leander Perez, Jr., stated publicly in 1965 that, if any 
known agitator were to appear in Plaquemines Parish, his mere presence would 
amount to a disturbance of the peace, since he was an outsider.   
Id. at 401.  
 274.  Duncan, 391 U.S. at 147. 
 275.  Id. 
 276.  Id. 
 277.  Id. 
 278.  Id. at 146. 
 279.  Id. 
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for all defendants,”280 as “the common-sense judgment of a jury” is 
substituted for “the more tutored but perhaps less sympathetic reac-
tion of the single judge.”281  Even though it was clear that Duncan was 
guilty of at least simple battery, since both sides agreed that Landry 
was the victim of an unwanted touching,282 the Court opined that a ju-
ry may have offered better protection against the “unfounded crimi-
nal charges.”283  Relying on then-current social science research on ju-
rors as fact finders,284 the Court tempered its acknowledgement of the 
government’s argument that trained professionals might do a better 
job of applying law to facts and make more accurate factual findings285 
with the observation that “when juries differ with the result at which 
the judge would have arrived, it is usually because they are serving 
some of the very purposes for which they were created and for which 
they are now employed.”286  As in Gault, the Court discussed the appli-
cable history, in this case, the history of the jury trial right.287 But there 
was no measured consideration of whether adding juries might reme-
dy any perceived shortcomings of state criminal proceedings, of 
whether bench trials are an adequate substitute for jury trials,288 or 
                                                        
 280.  Id. at 157–58. 
 281.  Id. at 156. 
 282.  Id. at 146 n.1, 147 (defining simple battery as “battery, without the consent of the 
victim, committed without a dangerous weapon” and stating that “appellant slapped Her-
man Landry, one of the white boys, on the elbow” (quoting LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:35 
(1950))); see also State v. J.L., 945 So.2d 884, 889 (La. Ct. App. 2006) (finding that a non-
consensual touching established the “essential elements of simple battery . . . beyond a 
reasonable doubt”). 
 283.  Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156. 
 284.  Id. at 157. 
 285.  Bowers, supra note 183, at 1692; see Duncan, 391 U.S. at 157 (acknowledging criti-
cisms “as to the wisdom of permitting untrained laymen to determine the facts in civil and 
criminal proceedings”). 
 286.  Duncan, 391 U.S. at 157. 
 287.  Id. at 151–54. 
 288.  The Court does make cursory note that: 
[T]he fact is that in most places more trials for serious crimes are to juries than 
to a court alone; a great many defendants prefer the judgment of a jury to that of 
a court.  Even where defendants are satisfied with bench trials, the right to a jury 
trial very likely serves its intended purpose of making judicial or prosecutorial 
unfairness less likely. 
Id. at 158. 
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even of the administrative costs of jury trials.  Because the Court’s ex-
tension of the jury trial right was based in the Sixth Amendment, 
there did not have to be.289 
B.  DeBacker v. Brainard: Setting the Stage for McKeiver 
DeBacker v. Brainard290 provided the most insight the Court would 
give on the juvenile jury trial right until McKeiver.  DeBacker presented 
the two issues that the Court would later take up in McKeiver and In re 
Winship291: whether juveniles facing delinquency proceedings are enti-
tled to a jury trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments,292 
and to adjudication under the proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
standard.293 
Seventeen-year-old Clarence DeBacker was charged with forgery 
of a bank check.294  At trial, he moved, unsuccessfully, for a jury trial.295  
He was convicted at trial by the county judge.296 
DeBacker’s juvenile court hearing was held March 28, 1968—
seven weeks prior to the Court’s ruling in Duncan.297  That seven weeks 
made the difference between considering and sidestepping the mer-
its: the Court determined that, since DeBacker’s trial occurred seven 
weeks before the Duncan decision was handed down and because of 
anti-retroactivity doctrine,298 DeBacker’s case did not properly present 
                                                        
 289.  See id. at 149 (finding the right to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment to be 
fundamental). 
 290.  396 U.S. 28 (1969). 
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 292.  Id. at 30.  
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the issue of whether juveniles facing delinquency proceedings are en-
titled to jury trials.299 
Besides the fact that it was a precursor for McKeiver, DeBacker is 
notable for its dissents.  Justices Black and Douglas dissented in a 
rights-based opinion.300  Justice Black made his intentions plain: “I can 
see no basis whatsoever in the language of the Constitution for allow-
ing persons like appellant the benefit of [the due process rights ex-
tended in Gault] and yet denying them a jury trial, a right which is 
surely one of the fundamental aspects of criminal justice in the Eng-
lish-speaking world.”301  He continued, foreshadowing what would 
emerge as the central tension identified two years later in McKeiver: 
“[t]he balancing of the rehabilitative purpose of the juvenile proceed-
ing with the due process requirement of a jury trial is a matter for a 
future Constitutional Convention,”302 for “[w]here there is a criminal 
trial charging a criminal offense, whether in conventional terms or in 
the language of delinquency, all of the procedural requirements of 
the Constitution and Bill of Rights come into play.”303 
Save the rights to “a speedy and public trial” and to a jury trial, by 
the time the Court considered McKeiver, juveniles enjoyed all the pro-
tections of the Sixth Amendment.  Moreover, by the time the Court 
considered McKeiver, the Court had decided one of the two DeBacker 
issues—the accused’s right to have each element proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt—in In re Winship, deciding in favor of granting ju-
veniles more due process protection.304 
                                                        
 299.  DeBacker, 396 U.S. at 30.  The Court also passed on the question of whether the 
preponderance of the evidence standard was properly applied to juvenile proceedings, 
ruling that this case was not an appropriate vehicle for consideration of the standard of 
proof the government must meet for juvenile delinquency adjudications because the issue 
had been effectively waived by juvenile defense counsel.  Id. at 31.  Juvenile defense coun-
sel had neither objected to the lower court’s application of the preponderance of the evi-
dence standard, nor moved the lower court for application of the beyond a reasonable 
doubt standard.  Id.  At oral argument before the Supreme Court, counsel even went so far 
as to concede the point, admitting that “even under a reasonable doubt standard” the gov-
ernment’s evidence would have been “sufficient to sustain a conviction.”  Id. 
 300.  Id. at 33 (Black, J., dissenting); Id. at 35 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 301.  Id. at 34 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 302.  Id. at 38.   
 303.  Id.  
 304.  See id. at 368 (holding that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof was 
required in juvenile cases). 
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C.  McKeiver v. Pennsylvania 
The Court’s three major juvenile rights decisions prior to McKeiv-
er—Kent v. United States, In re Gault, and In re Winship—had established 
fundamental fairness as the touchstone for Fourteenth Amendment 
analysis of the minimum due process protections required in juvenile 
proceedings.305  This line of cases affirmed that due process required 
juvenile delinquency proceedings to comport with “the essentials of 
due process and fair treatment.”306  But, coming as it did during the 
Civil Rights Movement and featuring a challenge to the absence of 
the right to a public trial by jury for black children protesting school 
segregation,307 McKeiver also fell squarely in the heart of the Supreme 
Court’s due process revolution.  Accordingly, McKeiver sat uneasily at 
the intersection of fundamental fairness and fundamental rights. 
McKeiver was a consolidation of two sets of cases, one set from 
Pennsylvania308 and the other from North Carolina.309  The Pennsylva-
nia cases presented typical juvenile delinquency matters.310  The North 
                                                        
 305.  See Kent, 383 U.S. at 554 (holding that due process requirements apply to transfer 
proceedings); Gault, 387 U.S. at 29–30 (holding that juveniles have right to notice of 
charges, right to counsel, privilege against self-incrimination, and right to confrontation 
and cross-examination in adjudicatory hearings in delinquency cases); Winship, 397 U.S. at 
368 (holding that fundamental fairness requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt in de-
linquency adjudications). 
 306.  Kent, 383 U.S. at 562. 
 307.  McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 536–37. 
 308.  Id. at 535. 
 309.  Id. at 538. 
 310.  Id. at 534–35.  The Pennsylvania cases arose from the appeals of two boys, sixteen-
year-old Joseph McKeiver and fifteen-year-old Edward Terry.  Id. at 534–35.  The allega-
tions against McKeiver were that, as part of a group of twenty or thirty other youths, he 
chased three young teenagers and took twenty-five cents from them.  Id. at 536.  McKeiver 
was charged with robbery, larceny, and receiving stolen goods.  Id. at 534.  The allegations 
against Terry were that he hit a police officer with his fists and with a stick when the officer 
broke up a fight that he and other youths were watching.  Id. at 536.  Terry was charged 
with assault and battery on a police officer and conspiracy.  Id. at 535.  At their respective 
trials, the boys’ attorneys moved for, but were denied, jury trials.  Id.  Both boys were con-
victed after bench trials, even though, at the close of McKeiver’s bench trial, the court de-
scribed the evidence against him as “weak,” and noted that McKeiver had a steady job and 
that this case was his first involvement with the juvenile justice system.  Id. at 535–36. 
It is worth discussing how extremely weak the evidence in McKeiver’s case was.  
McKeiver was charged with robbery, larceny and receiving stolen goods in a juvenile de-
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Carolina facts presented a very different scenario.  In In re Burrus,311 
one of the North Carolina cases, Barbara Burrus and approximately 
forty-five other black schoolchildren, ranging in age between eleven 
and fifteen years old, were charged in juvenile court with willfully im-
peding traffic.312  The allegations were that the children interfered 
with traffic as they participated in a demonstration protesting school 
assignments and a school consolidation plan in Hyde County.313  The 
demonstrators believed that the Hyde County “school system unlaw-
fully discriminated against black schoolchildren.”314  The lower court 
found that, “on various occasions the juveniles . . . were observed 
walking along Highway 64 singing, shouting, clapping, and playing 
basketball.”315  At trial, a lone highway patrolman testified that the 
children refused to leave the paved portion of the highway when 
asked.316  The cases were consolidated into groups, and James E. Fer-
guson, II, a prominent civil rights attorney in North Carolina and a 
cooperating attorney with the NAACP Legal Defense and Education 
                                                        
linquency petition.  Id. at 534–35.  Two alleged victims testified at trial.  Id. at 536.  One 
testified he was robbed by a gang, while the other testified that he was robbed by a lone 
thief.  In re Edward Terry, 265 A.2d 350, 351 n.1 (Pa. 1970).  One testified that he rode a 
bicycle away from the robbery, and was riding one when arrested, while the other testified 
that he identified the robber by his distinctive walk. Id.  Both testified that the robber was 
not wearing glasses, but McKeiver had worn them since childhood.  Id. 
 311. 167 S.E.2d 454, (N.C. Ct. App. 1969). 
 312.  McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 536. 
 313.  Id. 
 314.  Id. at 556. 
 315.  Id. at 537.  The racism of the lower court is all too apparent.  As the court related 
the underlying facts: 
  All of the cases stem from what may be classified as a concerted demonstra-
tion by Negroes of Hyde County to assert their definance [sic] of law and order 
and to disrupt the normal economic and social life of Hyde County by a wilful, 
intentional and flagrant disregard and violation of laws duly enacted by the gov-
erning bodies of the State for the public welfare and orderly conduct of human 
affairs for all citizens of the State.   
Burrus, 167 S.E.2d at 457.  The court’s overt discussion of “defiance,” “disrupt[ion],” and 
“wilful, intentional and flagrant disregard” by the “Negroes of Hyde County” reveals how 
completely the state appellate court’s view of the evidence and the case were shaped by 
racism. 
 316.  McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 537. 
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Fund,317 represented all of the children.318  In each case, counsel ob-
jected to the exclusion of the general public and requested a jury tri-
al.319  In each case, the general public was excluded,320 and the request 
for a jury trial was denied.321  Each of the children was found delin-
quent, and placed on probation for either one or two years.322  Each 
child was ordered to comply with the conditions of probation, which 
included not violating any North Carolina laws.323 
There is a direct connection between the McKeiver litigation and 
the African-American community’s early-twentieth-century concerns 
about the racially disparate treatment of black juveniles as compared 
to their white counterparts.  In re Burrus was a NAACP Legal Defense 
Fund (“LDF”) case, brought under the auspices of LDF’s National Of-
fice for the Rights of the Indigent (“NORI”) Project.324  A comparison 
between the petitioner’s briefs in McKeiver and Burrus325 reveal that 
the LDF saw Burrus and the possibility of importing jury trials into ju-
venile delinquency court as an avenue to prevent African-American 
children from receiving disparate and oppressive treatment by the ju-
venile courts.326  While the McKeiver brief did not develop the racial 
dimension of the issue, the LDF brief in Burrus paid careful attention 
to it.  For example, the Burrus brief specifically noted that African-
                                                        
 317.  See generally, James E. Ferguson, II, FERGUSON CHAMBERS & SUMPTER, P.A., 
http://fergusonstein.com/attorneys.php?attorneyId=3 (last visited Mar. 12, 2013) (provid-
ing more information about James Ferguson II).   
 318.  McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 530. 
 319.  Id. at 537. 
 320.  While the “public trial” right of the Sixth Amendment is beyond the scope of this 
Article, examination of that right in juvenile trials might raise similar questions. 
 321.  McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 537. 
 322.  Id. at 537–38. 
 323.  Id. at 538. 
 324.  For a brief description of NORI and its background, see JACK GREENBERG, 
CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS 430–60 (1994); MICHAEL MELTSNER, THE MAKING OF A CIVIL 
RIGHTS LAWYER 156–58 (2006). 
 325. See Brief for Petitioners, In re Burrus, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (No. 128), 1970 WL 
121988 [hereinafter Burrus Brief]; Brief for Petitioners, McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 
528 (1971) (No. 322), 1970 WL 136804 [hereinafter McKeiver Brief]. 
 326.  See Burrus Brief, supra note 325, at 10 (“A jury trial can play an important role to 
protect youth against the commonly observed abuses of the enormous discretion granted 
those administering juvenile courts—a discretion which often has been employed to the 
detriment of racially . . . disadvantaged groups.”). 
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American children were particularly vulnerable to unjust and unequal 
treatment in juvenile court,327 and it named the protection of jury trial 
as a safeguard against this.328  The Court’s near-total refusal to 
acknowledge the significance of the disparity in the juvenile court’s 
treatment of black youths is all the more striking in light of the LDF’s 
explicit and repeated invocation of the issue. 
The McKeiver opinion is a plurality, authored by Justice 
Blackmun, and joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices White and 
Stewart.329 Justice Harlan concurred in the judgment and filed a sepa-
rate opinion.330  Justice White also concurred and filed a separate 
opinion.331  Justice Douglas, joined by Justices Black and Marshall, dis-
sented.332  Focusing on the issue of the provision of a public trial or 
                                                        
 327.  Burrus Brief, supra note 325, at 23–24.  
 328.  Id. at 10, 24, 32.   
 329.  McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 530. 
 330.  Id. at 557.  Justice Harlan’s concurrence provided a fifth vote for the plurality’s 
ruling, “on a ground that was both narrower in its implications for juvenile law and much 
broader in its implications for criminal procedure.”  Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 191, 
at 561 n.35.  Justice Harlan, steadfast in his conviction that Duncan v. Louisiana wrongly 
extended the right to trial by jury to state proceedings, asserted that due process did not 
require jury trials in either criminal or delinquency trials.  McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 557 (Har-
lan, J., concurring).  It is notable, however, that Justice Harlan explained that if he were to 
accept Duncan as good law, then he “d[id] not see why, given Duncan, juveniles as well as 
adults would not be constitutionally entitled to jury trials, so long as juvenile delinquency 
systems are not restructured to fit their original purpose.”  Id.  
 331.  McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 551–53 (White, J., concurring).  Justice White agreed that 
juries were not constitutionally required in delinquency proceedings.  Id. at 551.  Justice 
White based his ruling on the fact that the rehabilitative nature of the juvenile court stems 
from the important distinction between “blameworthy” adult criminals, and juvenile of-
fenders whose acts were “not deemed the consequence of mature and malevolent choice 
but of environmental pressures (or lack of them) or of other forces beyond their control.”  
Id. at 552.  To Justice White, the “deterministic assumptions” of the juvenile justice system 
meant that the system did not “stigmatize the juvenile delinquent by branding him a crim-
inal; his conduct is not deemed so blameworthy that punishment is required to deter him 
or others.”  Id. at 551–52.  He also based his ruling on his understanding that “the conse-
quences of adjudication [in juvenile court were] less severe than those flowing from ver-
dicts of criminal guilt,” and that the primary objective of the juvenile justice system was 
treatment, not punishment, of children.  Id. at 552–53. 
 332.  Id. at 557–72 (Douglas, J., dissenting).  Justice Douglas’s dissent argued that be-
cause the distinction between “delinquent” juvenile proceedings and “criminal” adult pro-
ceedings was meaningless, Duncan established a right to a jury trial for “any person,” not 
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trial by jury, Justice Brennan concurred in the judgment concerning 
the Pennsylvania cases, but dissented from the plurality’s judgment 
for the North Carolina cases.333 
1.  Plurality by Justice Blackmun 
Justice Blackmun expressly declined to reach for the most facile 
answer to the question—that the “civil” label applied to juvenile court 
proceedings meant that Duncan, which extended the jury trial right to 
“criminal” cases, was not controlling—with the qualification that “the 
Court carefully has avoided this wooden approach.”334  Instead, he set 
out to apply the amorphous due process standard that the Court used 
in Kent and Gault, setting the Court’s task as “ascertain[ing] the pre-
cise impact of the due process requirement,”335 with Fourteenth 
Amendment fundamental fairness balancing and what would later 
become its traditional considerations, such as the importance of the 
interest at stake, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the interest 
because of the procedures used, the probable value of additional pro-
cedural safeguards, whether there is an adequate substitute for the 
requirement, and costs and other administrative concerns,336 as a 
guide. 
The plurality’s analysis incorporates many considerations that 
could not be taken into account in a fundamental rights analysis.  For 
example, just as the Gault majority considered whether there was an 
adequate substitute for the right to counsel,337 the McKeiver plurality 
                                                        
“any adult person . . . .”  Id. at 560.  The dissenters answered the argument that juvenile 
dispositions are not as serious as adult sentences with the observation that, in the North 
Carolina cases, the youngest child faced imprisonment of up to ten years, and all of the 
children faced imprisonment of up to five years.  Id. at 557–59.  Because it is clear that an 
adult facing imprisonment for that long would have been entitled to a jury trial, the dis-
sent argued, it is clear that that right should have been extended to the juveniles in the 
instant case.  Id. at 560. 
 333.  Id. at 553–57. 
 334.  Id. at 540–41 (majority opinion). 
 335.  Id. at 541. 
 336.  See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (setting out the factors to be 
considered in a due process analysis). 
 337.  See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967) (finding the probation officer and the judge 
inadequate substitutes for counsel). 
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considered whether there was an adequate substitute for juries.338  
Reasoning that juries are not required in several types of cases, includ-
ing equity, worker’s compensation, probate, or deportation cases, Jus-
tice Blackmun summarily concluded that the jury is not “a necessary 
component of accurate factfinding.”339  The plurality expressed its 
unqualified endorsement of the adequacy of judicial factfinding with-
out support.  The plurality also dismissed out of hand the appellants’ 
concerns about the unfairness of: “the inapplicability of exclusionary 
and other rules of evidence;” “the juvenile court judge’s possible 
awareness of the juvenile’s prior record and . . . the contents of the 
social file;” and “repeated appearances of the same familiar witnesses 
in the persons of juvenile and probation officers and social work-
ers.”340  The plurality even went so far as to intimate that raising the 
specter of unfairness flouted “every aspect of fairness, of concern, of 
sympathy, and of paternal attention that the juvenile court system 
contemplates.”341 
Justice Blackmun further acknowledged that the reality of juve-
nile court fell far short of its ideal, enumerating a litany of the juve-
nile justice system’s profound shortcomings, including a dearth of 
professional help and resources; a surfeit of apathy and an “unwill-
ingness to . . . be concerned” from the community; and a paucity of 
dispositional alternatives.342  Far from the white-coated experts the 
Court described in In re Winship,343 the grim reality was that, at the 
time that McKeiver was decided, half of juvenile court judges—the very 
factfinders whose skills were at issue in McKeiver—had not received 
undergraduate degrees, and a fifth had received no college education 
                                                        
 338.  See McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 541–42 (outlining Pennsylvania and North Carolina’s ar-
guments that jury trials were not necessary in juvenile proceedings, given the other safe-
guards in place). 
 339.  Id. at 543.  Paul Bator has written what is arguably the seminal article on what 
“truth” or “accuracy” mean in criminal proceedings.  Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal 
Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 441–42 (1963).  In a 
nutshell, the argument is that there is no “truth” in criminal proceedings, only process.  Id.  
The old adage that 100 guilty people should go free before convicting one innocent per-
son is of course a great example. 
 340.  McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 550. 
 341.  Id. 
 342.  Id. at 544. 
 343.  See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 375 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring) (noting the 
essential purposes behind juvenile courts included rehabilitation, avoiding stigmatization, 
and overly burdensome procedural requirements). 
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at all.344  But, even in the face of “all these disappointments, all these 
failures, and all these shortcomings,” the plurality concluded that the 
system was not so damaged as to require the Court to jettison the ide-
al of the informal, rehabilitative juvenile justice system altogether.345 
The plurality opinion detailed misgivings about the formality that 
attends jury trials and how that formality might interrupt the intimate, 
individualized, rehabilitative—and aspirational—vision of juvenile 
court.346  It noted that jury trials might remake juvenile court into a 
“fully adversary process.”347  It also lodged an administrative objection, 
not available in a substantive due process analysis, predicting that ex-
tending jury trials to juvenile proceedings “would bring with it into 
that system the traditional delay, the formality, and the clamor of the 
adversary system and, possibly, the public trial.”348 
Just as important, however, is what the plurality failed to consid-
er.  The plurality was silent on the racial failings of the juvenile sys-
tem.  While the Court catalogued the juvenile court’s many deficien-
cies, it did so without consideration that the Child Savers’ ideal itself 
might have been corrupt, to the extent that it was a white ideal not 
meant to apply to youth of color.349  Confronting that reality might 
have made the Court choose a rights-based analysis rather than a fair-
ness-based analysis, as it had in so many other cases. 
2.  Justice Brennan and the Right to a Public Trial 
Justice Brennan filed an opinion concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part.350  Justice Brennan agreed that juvenile proceedings do 
not constitute criminal proceedings under the aegis of the Sixth 
Amendment.351  The issues that most concerned Justice Brennan were 
(1) the reasons the jury process is needed, and (2) whether there is 
an adequate substitute for the process.352  With respect to the first is-
sue, Justice Brennan considered “whether [the] jury trial is among the 
                                                        
 344.  Id. at 544 n.4. 
 345.  Id. at 545. 
 346.  Id. 
 347.  Id. 
 348.  Id. at 550. 
 349.  See supra Part II.B.1. 
 350.  McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 553. 
 351.  Id. at 553. 
 352.  Id. at 553–57. 
  
2013] FUNDAMENTAL UNFAIRNESS 659 
‘essentials of due process and fair treatment.’”353  In a quintessential 
fundamental fairness analysis that makes room for a substitute for a 
fundamental right, he concluded that the right to a jury trial was not 
such a right, so long as the state’s procedure “protect[s] the juvenile 
from oppression by the Government” and the “compliant, biased, or 
eccentric judge.”354  He found that a public trial grants protection 
against “possible oppression by what is in essence an appeal to the 
community conscience”355 as much as a jury does, and so concluded 
that a juvenile’s jury trial depended on whether that juvenile was af-
forded the right to a public trial.356 
Justice Brennan’s concurrence diverged from the rationale of the 
plurality, by considering the advantages of a jury beyond its role as 
simple fact finder in his analysis of whether there is an adequate sub-
stitute for a jury trial.357  Accordingly, Justice Brennan concurred with 
the judgment as to the Pennsylvania case (as Pennsylvania law at that 
time could be read to afford juveniles the right to a public trial), and 
dissented with the judgment as to the North Carolina case (because 
North Carolina required closed proceedings).358 
The difference between the plurality’s understanding of the ju-
ry’s role and Justice Brennan’s conceptualization of the jury’s role is 
of particular moment.  The plurality reduced the role of the jury to 
that of a mere factfinder,359 and ignored the jury’s critical function as 
a representation of the community’s conscience, which the Court ele-
vated in Duncan when it stated that “when juries differ with the result 
at which the judge would have arrived, it is usually because they are 
serving some of the very purposes for which they were created and for 
which they are now employed.”360 
McKeiver resulted because the Court did not go far enough in 
Gault, and Duncan, the adult criminal analog to McKeiver, brings this 
failure into stark relief. Had the Court based youths’ due process 
                                                        
 353.  Id. at 553 (quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30 (1967)). 
 354.  Id. at 554–55. 
 355.  Id.  
 356.  Id. at 555. 
 357.  See id. at 555–56 (discussing how public trials could serve the same functions as 
jury trials, including protecting against “misuse of the judicial process”). 
 358.  Id. at 554–57. 
 359.  Id. at 543. 
 360.  Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157 (1968). 
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rights in the Bill of Rights and not in Fourteenth Amendment fun-
damental fairness, McKeiver would have had a very different result. 
IV.  THE WORLD THAT GAULT MADE: CURRENT JUVENILE COURT AND 
DISPROPORTIONATE MINORITY CONTACT 
A.  Disproportionate Minority Contact 
The Supreme Court’s embrace of fundamental fairness as the ba-
sis of juvenile procedural protections rather than fundamental rights, 
coupled with the long history of racialized treatment of black chil-
dren, exacerbated disparate treatment of children of color in the ju-
venile justice system. 
The data are shocking and familiar.  A grossly disproportionate 
majority of youth in the juvenile justice system are children of color.361  
In 2008, juvenile courts handled 1.7 million delinquency cases.362  The 
Department of Justice reported that in 2008, although children of 
color comprised only 22% of the country’s youth population, and alt-
hough rates of commission of crime were static across racial groups, 
children of color accounted for at least 54% of arrests for violent 
crime, and 36% of arrests for property crimes.363  Black youth, at only 
16% of the population, were most overrepresented in juvenile ar-
rests.364  Between 2002 and 2004, for example, African Americans 
                                                        
 361.  NAT’L COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, supra note 11, at 1; see also JEFF 
ARMOUR & SARAH HAMMOND, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, MINORITY 
YOUTH IN THE JUVENILE SYSTEM 4 (2009), available at http://www.ncsl.org/print/cj/ 
minoritiesinjj.pdf (stating that “[m]inority juveniles are confined and sentenced for longer 
periods and are less likely to receive alternative sentences or probation compared to white 
juveniles”). 
 362.  CRYSTAL KNOLL & MELISSA SICKMUND, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & 
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FACT SHEET: DELINQUENCY CASES IN 
JUVENILE COURT, 2008, at 1 (2011), available at http://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/236479.pdf. 
 363.  Id. In 2008, the population of children in the United States between the ages of 
ten to seventeen was 78% white, 16% black, 5% Asian/Pacific Islander, and 1% American 
Indian.  Id. 
 364.  CHARLES PUZZANCHERA, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY 
PREVENTION, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE JUSTICE BULLETIN: JUVENILE ARRESTS 2008, at 9 
(2009), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/228479.pdf.  For violent crime 
arrests, 47% involved white and Latino youth, 52% involved black youth, 1% involved 
Asian youth, and 1% involved American Indian youth.  Id.  For property crime arrests, the 
proportions were 65% white and Latino youth, 33% black youth, 2% Asian youth, and 1% 
American Indian youth.  Id.  
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comprised 28% of juvenile arrests, 30% of court referrals, 37% of de-
tained youth, 38% of youth placed out of their home, 34% of youth 
waived to adult court, and 58% of youth locked in adult prisons.365  An 
African-American boy is nine times more likely to be detained for a 
drug offense as a white boy charged with the exact same offense.366  
An African-American boy has a one-in-three chance of being sent to 
prison.367 
The disparate treatment only begins at arrest.  Youth of color are 
disproportionately represented and receive worse outcomes com-
pared to their white counterparts at every decision-making point in 
the juvenile justice system.368  And, it is widely acknowledged that 
overrepresentation of youth of color in the juvenile justice system 
cannot be explained by rates of offending, which are static across ra-
cial and ethnic groups;369 arrest rates, which hover near an all-time 
low;370 or demographics, as disproportionate minority contact exists in 
nearly every state—even states with very small populations of people 
of color.371  It is also widely acknowledged that the possible causes in-
clude conscious or unconscious racial bias372 in combination with the 
enormous discretion that the juvenile justice system affords its actors. 
                                                        
 365.  Katayoon Majd, Students of the Mass Incarceration Nation, 54 HOW. L.J. 343, 360 
(2011). 
 366.  W. HAYWOOD BURNS INSTITUTE FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE FAIRNESS AND EQUITY, 
DISPROPORTIONATE MINORITY CONFINEMENT/CONTACT (DMC) FACT SHEET, available at 
http://www.burnsinstitute.org/downloads/FACT%20SHEET%20BI.doc (last visited Mar. 
13, 2013). 
 367.  Id.; ACT 4 JUVENILE JUSTICE FACT SHEET: DISPROPORTIONATE MINORITY CONTACT 
(DMC), available at http://www.cclp.org/documents/JJDPA/DMC_Fact_Sheet.pdf. 
 368.  NAT’L COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, supra note 11; ARMOUR & 
HAMMOND, supra note 361. 
 369.  See KNOLL & SICKMUND, supra note 362, at 2 (reporting the trends of delinquency 
cases in juvenile court). 
 370.  Id. at 1. 
 371.  See BELL & RIDOLFI, supra note 90, at 2, 8, 10 (explaining that children of color 
“comprise 35 percent of the total U.S. youth population, yet make up 65 percent of all 
youth who are securely detained pre-adjudication”). 
 372.  Geoff Ward et al., Racial Politics of Juvenile Justice Policy Support: Juvenile Court Worker 
Orientations Toward Disproportionate Minority Confinement, 1 RACE & JUSTICE 154, 158–59, 175 
(2011); see also BELL & RIDOLFI, supra note 90, at 10 (explaining that thirty-two of forty-four 
states found “evidence of ethnic or racial differences in juvenile justice system decision-
making that was unaccounted for by differential criminal activity”).   
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This phenomenon, the overrepresentation and disparate treat-
ment of children of color in the juvenile justice system, has been 
named disproportionate minority contact (“DMC”), and has been ex-
tensively documented in every state.373 
B.  Modern-Day Juvenile Court Practice 
The history of the treatment of black system-involved children 
begins to give these numbers dimension; the Court’s misstep in Gault 
completes the explanation.  Chronicling the life of a typical juvenile 
case illuminates how the current juvenile justice system, ostensibly 
race-neutral, allows system actor discretion and its consequence, dis-
parate treatment of youth of color, to flourish in juvenile proceed-
ings.374  The legal process that contributes to this overrepresentation 
can be laid at the feet of the Gault decision. 
1.  Citation or Arrest 
A juvenile case usually starts with an encounter with the police.375  
In 2009, 83% of cases referred to juvenile court came from law en-
forcement agencies.376  Black youth, at only 16% of the population, 
were most overrepresented in juvenile arrests.377  At arrest, the police 
officer, who most often does not live in the child’s neighborhood, has 
broad discretion to determine the direction the child’s case will 
take.378  On one end of the spectrum of police intervention, the of-
ficer can choose to divert the arrest, allowing the youth to avoid juve-
                                                        
 373.  See ACT 4 JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 367, at 1 (explaining that the Juvenile Jus-
tice and Delinquency Prevention Act requires States to “address” DMC within the juvenile 
justice system and jurisdictions need to “approach this work with focused, informed, and 
data-driven strategies”). 
 374.  See infra Parts IV.B.1–2. 
 375.  See Birckhead, supra note 57, at 70–80 for a comprehensive discussion of the most 
common points of entry into juvenile delinquency court—the child welfare and status of-
fender systems, public schools, retail stores, and neighborhood police presence. 
 376.  OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
STATISTICAL BRIEFING BOOK: CASE FLOW DIAGRAM, available at http://www.ojjdp.gov/ 
ojstatbb/structure_process/case.html (last visited Nov. 28, 2012).  
 377.  See supra text accompanying note 364.  
 378.  Cf. SARAH LIVSEY, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE’S DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, FACT SHEET: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PROBATION CASELOAD, 2007, at 1 (2010), 
available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/230170.pdf (“Probation supervision was 
the most severe disposition in 34% (561,600) of all delinquency cases.”). 
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nile court altogether.379  The officer might decide to counsel the child 
and release him, simply return him to his parents, or offer the child 
the option of some voluntary sanction.380  Of the 1.7 million delin-
quency cases in 2008, 423,400 cases, or 25%, were addressed informal-
ly, with the youth agreeing to a community-based sanction like per-
forming community service, paying restitution, writing a letter of 
apology, or taking a class aimed at deterring the child from commit-
ting the specific offense in the future.381  On the other end of the 
spectrum, the officer might choose to arrest the child and detain him 
until his initial court appearance, where a judge will decide where the 
child will be placed pending trial.382 
The opportunities for discretion between these two points are 
limitless.  For example, almost 70% of juvenile arrests are referred to 
juvenile court.383  But a case can be referred through a formal arrest, 
after which the officer might release the child with a date to appear in 
court, or through a ticket or citation, after which the officer might re-
lease the child with a court date.384  The officer often makes this criti-
cal, early-stage determination after talking to the complaining witness, 
the youth, and the youth’s parents, evaluating the demeanor and re-
action of the youth and of the youth’s parents, and reviewing the 
youth’s prior contacts with the juvenile justice and child welfare sys-
tems.385 
In addition to the initial decision about diversion or referral, the 
officer also makes a recommendation as to what the child’s charges 
should be.  The vast majority of juvenile referrals involve minor 
crimes, like disorderly conduct, disturbing the peace, minor assaults 
                                                        
 379.  Id. at 3. 
 380.  Id. 
 381.  See KNOLL & SICKMUND, supra note 362, at 3 (explaining the statistics on intake 
decisions and decisions of authorities). 
 382.  See id. (explaining that over half of the delinquency cases in 2008 were handled 
formally). 
 383.  See PUZZANCHERA, supra note 364, at 5 (showing that, in 2008, most arrested juve-
niles were referred to court, whereas the others were referred to a welfare agency or to an-
other police agency).  
 384.  See KNOLL & SICKMUND, supra note 362, at 3 (explaining that in 56% of cases (or 
in 924,400 cases), authorities filed a petition and the case was handled formally). 
 385.  OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM STRUCTURE & PROCESS [hereinafter STRUCTURE’S PROCESS], 
available at http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/structure_process/case.html (last visited Mar. 
22, 2012). 
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over school-related issues, and violating curfew.  Since these are the 
kinds of crimes that label typically defiant youthful behavior, the of-
ficer has a great deal of discretion at this point in the process.386  For 
example, if a child refuses to show her school identification to a hall 
monitor, the officer can choose to see the child’s reaction as mouth-
ing off, or charge the child with resisting arrest.387 
2.  Intake and Detention 
Once the child has been referred to juvenile court, the child un-
dergoes the intake process.388  Intake usually involves the child being 
evaluated by a juvenile probation officer.389  Here too, the decision 
maker has a great deal of discretion that wreaks an unfairness.390  As 
part of intake, the probation officer investigates the child’s back-
ground to make a recommendation to the court about whether the 
child should be detained, released, or placed in a community-based 
group home pending trial.391  If the child has been detained, this in-
vestigation has to happen in the few short hours—usually less than 
twenty-four hours—between the arrest and the youth’s first court ap-
pearance.392  If the child has been released, the investigation usually 
takes place on the morning of the court appearance.393 
                                                        
 386.  See KNOLL & SICKMUND, supra note 362, at 3 (explaining that authorities can de-
cide at intake which track to take with a case); see also WARD, supra note 4, at 159 (noting 
that unconscious bias of authority figures influences whether they see juvenile behavior as 
culpable or not).   
 387.  See WARD, supra note 4, at 159 (explaining that authority figures choose, often sub-
liminally, whether to see juvenile conduct as culpable or not). 
 388.  STRUCTURE’S PROCESS, supra note 385. 
 389.  Id. 
 390.  See id. (noting that the court decides if it is in the “best interests” of the child or 
community to keep the juvenile in detention, and that the prosecutor has discretion to try 
the juvenile in the criminal or juvenile system). 
 391.  Id. 
 392.  Id.   
 393.  Cf. Eugene H. Czajkoski, Exposing the Quasi-Judicial Role of the Probation Officer, 37 
FED. PROBATION 9, 9–11 (1973) (noting that the probation officer has taken on a quasi-
judicial role and is given a high degree of discretion in making the juvenile’s placement 
recommendations).  The fact that the police have already made the determination that 
the youth should be released, and that the youth has returned to court, usually combine to 
amount to continued release, making the intake interview less urgent.  Cf. Jack F. Williams, 
Process and Prediction: A Return to a Fuzzy Model of Pretrial Detention, 79 MINN. L. REV. 325, 
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In many jurisdictions, the probation officer will rely on a form 
that assigns values to different parts of the child’s background.394  At 
the end of the investigation, the probation officer calculates the 
child’s score, which determines the probation officer’s placement 
recommendation.395  Usually, the higher the score, the more likely it is 
that the probation officer will ask that the child be detained or placed 
in a group home.396  Some of the things that probation officers take 
into account include: the youth’s prior criminal involvement; reports 
from school officials about the youth’s attendance, grades, and behav-
ior; reports from the youth’s parent or guardian about the youth’s 
behavior at home; other features of the youth’s home environment, 
like whether the youth has family members who are involved in the 
juvenile or criminal justice systems; the demeanor of the youth; and 
the demeanor—and, more specifically, the level of cooperation—of 
the youth’s parent or guardian.397  Ostensibly race-neutral, these crite-
ria adversely affect youths whose parents or guardians question the 
child’s involvement in the juvenile justice system; whose parents or 
guardians are not easily reachable by telephone; who do not have a 
fixed address; who do not participate in extracurricular activities like 
church, Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts, or sports teams, which require money 
for uniforms and other participation-related costs; and parents or 
guardians with flexible schedules to ferry the youths to and from activ-
ities.398 
The probation officer’s range of recommendations might in-
clude some kind of deferred prosecution, where the youth’s case is 
                                                        
326–27 (1994) (describing the injustice and harm that results when criminal defendants 
are forced to remain in pretrial detention before a hearing).   
 394.  See, e.g., Robert D. Hoge, Standardized Instruments for Assessing Need and Risk in 
Youthful Offenders, 29 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 380, 387–91 (2002) (providing examples of 
several instruments used to evaluate risk and need factors). 
 395.  See id. at 381 (explaining factors a probation officer may consider in making his 
recommendation). 
 396.  See George S. Bridges & Sara Steen, Racial Disparities in Official Assessment of Juvenile 
Offenders: Attributional Stereotypes as Mediating Mechanisms, 63 AM. SOC. REV. 554, 557 (1998) 
(“[O]fficials’ judgments about the causes of crime along with relevant characteristics of a 
youth’s case and criminal history will influence assessment of risk . . . .”). 
 397.  See id. at 559; Hoge, supra note 394, at 387–91 (describing the factors considered). 
 398.  See Bridges & Steen, supra note 396, at 557–58, 566 (explaining that officials often 
view minority offenders differently, and noting that factors considered in whether the 
youth may reoffend include race, assessment of the youth’s family, and the youth’s “social 
history”). 
  
666 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:607 
postponed for several months, and if the youth does not get rearrest-
ed in that time period, the case is dismissed; probation before judg-
ment, where the youth enters a guilty plea, the case is postponed for 
several months, and if the youth complies with certain release condi-
tions during that time period, like clean drug tests, satisfactory school 
attendance, and checking in with the probation officer, the guilty plea 
is withdrawn and the case is dismissed; pretrial release with condi-
tions; detention in a group home; or detention in a maximum securi-
ty juvenile facility.399  In some jurisdictions, probation can entail ex-
plicitly recommended conditions for the youth’s parents, like 
enrollment in parenting classes.400  Even where such recommenda-
tions are not expressly given, in practice, any condition placed on the 
youth necessarily involves the time or resources of the youth’s parent 
or guardian, who has to help ensure the youth’s compliance.401 
3.  Prosecutorial Charging Decision 
With the police reports and the probation officer’s recommenda-
tion in hand, the juvenile prosecutor makes the charging decision.402  
In juvenile court, the prosecutor enjoys full discretion to decide 
whether and what charges to bring, without the check of a grand ju-
ry.403 
                                                        
 399.  See Stephen J. Rackmill, Printzlien’s Legacy, the “Brooklyn Plan,” A.K.A. Deferred Prose-
cution, 60 FED. PROBATION 8, 8–9 (1996) (explaining that “deferred prosecution” for juve-
niles occurs when the “prosecutor would hold the charges in abeyance for a specific 
timeframe contingent upon good behavior.  If the youngster did well on supervision, the 
case was closed.  In the event the supervision term was unsatisfactory, the prosecutor would 
process the original complaint”). 
 400.  See George W. Smyth, The Juvenile Court and Delinquent Parents, 13 FED. PROBATION 
12, 12 (1949) (explaining that there are “modifications which are desirable in home sur-
roundings and parental attitudes” that will help children experience “better example and 
guidance”). 
 401.  See id. at 12–13 (“No problem of a neglected or delinquent child can be treated 
successfully without also considering the attitude and actions of the parents.”). 
 402.  See Eric K. Klein, Dennis the Menace or Billy the Kid: An Analysis of the Role of Transfer 
to Criminal Court in Juvenile Justice, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 371, 397 (1998) (noting the prose-
cutor’s “largely unchecked” discretion in charging). 
 403.  Bowers, supra note 183, at 1659. 
  
2013] FUNDAMENTAL UNFAIRNESS 667 
The pressure for convictions, however, is no less present than in 
adult criminal court.404  While there are no studies of the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion in juvenile delinquency court,405 reference to 
a study of prosecutorial charging decisions in misdemeanor criminal 
cases, also considered low-stakes court, is instructive.406  As revealed by 
a recent investigation of charging decisions in New York and Iowa 
criminal courts, prosecutors charge misdemeanor, low-stakes offenses 
at higher rates than serious, high-stakes felony offenses.407  Iowa’s 2008 
declination rates show that prosecutors declined to prosecute violent 
                                                        
 404.  See Klein, supra note 402, at 397 (explaining that prosecutors may feel pressure to 
prosecute children as adults, to avoid public outcry). 
 405.  There are, however, several studies examining the transfer of juvenile cases for 
prosecution in adult criminal court.  See generally Klein, supra note 402.  
In a November 2007 report, the Effects on Violence of Laws and Policies Facilitating 
the Transfer of Youth from the Juvenile to the Adult Justice System, an independent task 
force of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
conducted a systematic review of published scientific evidence concerning the ef-
fectiveness of laws and policies that facilitate the transfer of juveniles to the adult 
criminal justice system to determine whether these transfers prevent or reduce 
violence among youth who have been transferred and among the juvenile popu-
lation as a whole. . . . [T]he Task Force recommends against laws or policies fa-
cilitating the transfer of juveniles to the adult criminal justice system for the pur-
pose of reducing violence. 
ROBERT HAHN ET AL., TASK FORCE ON CMTY. PREVENTIVE SERVS., CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION, EFFECTS OF VIOLENCE OF LAWS AND POLICIES FACILITATING THE 
TRANSFER OF YOUTH FROM THE JUVENILE TO THE ADULT JUSTICE SYSTEM (2007), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/rr5609a1.htm. 
 406. Other similarities between juvenile court practice and misdemeanor practice make 
the comparison useful.  In both courts, the possible exposure is not considered as severe as 
the exposure in criminal court.  In misdemeanor court, defendants generally cannot be 
sentenced to longer than six months incarceration for each offense charged.  In juvenile 
court, a youth cannot be under the court’s supervision past the upper age of juvenile court 
jurisdiction, and even if the youth is committed and detained, the youth theoretically re-
ceives rehabilitative services, like education, drug treatment, vocational training and 
health care.  In addition, the most serious cases are weeded out of both courts.  By defini-
tion, serious felonies are not tried in misdemeanor courts.  Similarly, the most serious ju-
venile cases are often transferred for prosecution in adult criminal court, so that the only 
cases processed in juvenile court are petty offenses, like assault or disorderly conduct cases 
from schoolyard fights, marijuana drug possession cases, prostitution cases, and petty theft 
charges. 
 407.  Bowers, supra note 183, at 1715–17. 
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felonies and misdemeanors almost three times as often as petty public 
order felonies and misdemeanors.408  In addition, “all felonies were 
declined over fourteen times as often as all simple misdemeanors.”409  
The New York data yielded similar results: In charging decisions from 
2005 to 2008, New York prosecutors charged petty public order 
crimes far more frequently than felonies.410  “[P]rosecutors even de-
clined homicide at more than twice the rate (5.01%) that they de-
clined turnstile hops or prostitution.”411 
This study supports anecdotal evidence that juvenile court prose-
cutors overcharge.412  Even in jurisdictions where the number of 
charges would make no difference in the sentence, juvenile prosecu-
tors charge the most serious possible offense (the better to plea bar-
gain with); the highest number of charges; and a higher number of 
youths than circumstances might warrant.413  This charging practice is 
ill-fitted for juvenile court particularly in light of the fact that the 
overwhelming majority of youths grow out of law-offending behavior 
without any intervention from the court.414 
4.  Detention Decision 
Though states’ statutes can vary, “[p]re-trial detention of juve-
niles has two general purposes: (1) to protect public safety and (2) to 
ensure the youth’s appearance at future hearings.”415  Juvenile juris-
prudence allows preventive detention of juveniles accused of crimes, 
and statutory descriptions of factors to be considered by a court in 
                                                        
 408.  Id. at 1716–17. 
 409.  Id. at 1716 (emphasis omitted). 
 410.  Id. at 1718–19. 
 411.  Id. at 1719. 
 412.  See id. at 1712–20 (describing reasons why “disposable” cases are charged much 
more frequently than serious felonies). 
 413.  See Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Punishment, Treat-
ment, and the Difference it Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821, 847–50 (1988) [hereinafter Feld, Prin-
ciple of Offense] (noting that juvenile sentences are “characteristically indeterminate” and 
that juvenile judges have “virtually unrestricted” authority to sentence). 
 414.  See id. at 896–902 (noting that most youths are still forming their legal, moral, and 
cognitive reasoning until the age of fourteen and before this time are not fully culpable 
for their decisions). 
 415.  ELIZABETH CALVIN, NAT’L JUVENILE DEFENDER CENTER, ADVOCACY AND TRAINING 
GUIDE: LEGAL STRATEGIES TO REDUCE THE UNNECESSARY DETENTION OF CHILDREN 10 
(2004), available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/detention_guide.pdf. 
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deciding whether to detain a youth vary.  “Some state laws require a 
‘substantial’ likelihood of failure to appear.”416  “Many state juvenile 
justice statutes define ‘danger to the public’ to include danger to self.  
Other states consider contempt of court or violation of a previous 
probation order as factors in detention decisions.”417  In most jurisdic-
tions, the judge who makes the initial pretrial detention decision will 
preside over the trial.418  In the name of being fully informed to make 
this decision, the judge is exposed to a range of social information—
such “broad and expansive access” that, in the opinion of one com-
mentator, “may move the justice system dangerously close to a breach 
of due process.”419 
The detention decision is integral because it impacts the youth’s 
ability to prepare for trial.420  A detained youth cannot assist as well in 
preparing for trial as a youth released into the community, who can 
take an active role in case investigation.421  A detained youth also does 
not have the opportunity to make a good impression on the court 
that a youth in the community has.422  Each day that a youth is in the 
community and does not reoffend is conclusive proof of the youth’s 
                                                        
 416.  Id. at 10 (“Some states, like Florida, define danger to the public narrowly, requir-
ing a ‘substantial risk of bodily harm as evidenced by recent behavior.’”). 
 417.  Id. 
 418.  See Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 191, at 571–73 (explaining that judges often 
preside over pretrial hearings and bench trials in the same case). 
 419.  Gary Solomon, I Got the Post-McKeiver Blues, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 105, 107 (2007); 
see also Theodore Eisenberg et al., Judge-Jury Agreement in Criminal Cases: A Partial Replication 
of Kalven and Zeisel’s The American Jury, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 171 (2005).  Eisenberg 
and his team studied judge-jury agreement rates in a sample of 300 criminal trials across 
four jurisdictions.  Id. at 173.  Judges filled out two questionnaires, one pre-jury verdict and 
another post-jury verdict.  Id. at 175–76.  The agreement rates confirmed the agreement 
rates in an earlier study performed by Kalven and Zeisel: Judges and the jury agreed to 
convict 75% of the time.  Id. at 180–83.  In 6% of the cases, the jury convicted when the 
judge would have acquitted; in 19% of the cases, the jury acquitted when the judge would 
have convicted.  Id. at 181.  Eisenberg found no correlation between the rate of disagree-
ment and the complexity of the trial.  Id. at 190–91.  Instead, the juries seemed to apply a 
higher standard for finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id. at 185; see also Jennifer K. 
Robbennolt, Evaluating Juries by Comparison to Judges: A Benchmark for Judging?, 32 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 469, 478–79 (2005) (citing a similar study that found a consistent judge-jury 
agreement rate around 73%). 
 420.  Calvin, supra note 415, at 3. 
 421.  Id. 
 422.  Id. 
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potential to be a law-abiding member of the community.  In addition, 
detention halls are often crowded, dangerous,423 and unhygienic.424  
Studies show that time spent in detention increases the likelihood 
that a child will recidivate, in part because detention is a one-two 
punch: not only is the child likely to make negative peer connec-
tions,425 but also any positive, community-based relationships (in par-
ticular, with the child’s family) are interrupted.  In fact, detention, as 
a predictor of future criminality, is more reliable than gang affiliation, 
weapons possession, or family dysfunction.426  Indeed, detention is a 
demonstrated gateway into the juvenile delinquency system.427  Not 
only are children from ethnic and racial minority groups dispropor-
tionately confined at detention hearings, but they also suffer the ef-
fects of detention more acutely than other children.428 
5.  Pretrial Hearings 
On the theory that trial court judges can do the “mental gymnas-
tics”429 necessary to consider, but not be unduly influenced by, inad-
                                                        
 423.  BARRY HOLMAN & JASON ZIEDENBERG, JUSTICE POLICY INST. THE DANGERS OF 
DETENTION: THE IMPACT OF INCARCERATING YOUTH IN DETENTION AND OTHER SECURE 
FACILITIES, JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE REPORT 2 (2006), available at http://www.justice 
policy.org/images/upload/06-11_REP_DangersOfDetention_JJ.pdf. 
 424.  See CALVIN, supra note 415, at 58–61. 
 425.  Id. at 4–6. 
 426.  Id. at 4. 
 427.  Id. at 1; see also NAT’L JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., ACHIEVING EXCELLENCE IN 
DETENTION ADVOCACY: GUIDELINES FOR JUVENILE DEFENDERS TO PROVIDE ZEALOUS 
ADVOCACY AT DETENTION HEARINGS, available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/njdc_tools/ 
Guidelines.pdf (last visited Mar.13, 2013) (providing advocacy tips for representatives act-
ing on behalf of juveniles). 
 428.  See CALVIN, supra note 415, at 49–50, 65–69. 
 429.  For example, many jurisdictions allow juvenile court judges to incorporate the pre-
trial suppression hearing testimony and the trial testimony in bench trials, and to preside 
over the pleas of co-respondents.  See, e.g., United States v. Abanatha, 999 F.2d 1246, 1250 
(8th Cir. 1993) (“Someone has to decide what facts to consider and what facts to ignore.  
We trust that decision-making responsibility to the trial judge.  Sometimes this responsibil-
ity requires difficult mental gymnastics—as in a bench trial where the judge decides both 
what facts to admit into evidence and how to weigh that evidence—but trial judges manage 
such feats of objectivity all the time.”).  The McKeiver appellants expressed “[c]oncern” 
that “the inapplicability of exclusionary and other rules of evidence[;] . . . the juvenile 
court judge’s possible awareness of the juvenile’s prior record and the contents of the so-
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missible evidence, many jurisdictions allow juvenile court judges to be 
exposed to such evidence and still make the guilt or innocence de-
termination.430 
The potential prejudice begins just after arrest, and touches eve-
ry stage of the case.  The same judge who presides over the detention 
hearing often also handles pretrial status hearings, at which discovery 
and scheduling matters are discussed; pretrial motions and motions 
hearings; and any co-respondents’ matters.431  So, for example, if the 
juvenile defense attorney files an ex parte motion for expert funds but 
then does not call the expert, the judge might make a kind of imper-
missible missing witness inference, assuming that the expert was not 
called because the expert’s testimony would have damaged the de-
fense’s case.  The judge might also preside over other matters, like en-
try of a guilty plea from co-respondents consideration of the circum-
stances of the juvenile’s confession, or possession of contraband in a 
suppression hearing.432 
At each of these hearings, the court engages in a searching in-
quiry of how the child is faring in the community.433  The parent or 
guardian, who, in many jurisdictions, is required to come to court 
with the child, is questioned about the child’s behavior at home and 
school performance.  The parent or guardian is also often encour-
aged to contact the court if the child misbehaves, as a way of getting 
help to control the child’s behavior.434  So long as the court has made 
a probable cause determination, at any sign that the child’s behavior 
                                                        
cial file; [and the] repeated appearances of the same familiar witnesses in the persons of 
juvenile and probation officers and social workers” created “the likelihood of pre-
judgment.”  McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 550 (1971). 
 430.  Barry C. Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice: Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile Court, 69 
MINN. L. REV. 141, 231–41 (1984). 
 431.  Id. at 232–38. 
 432.  See id. at 229–38 (explaining that the juvenile judge often presides over evidentiary 
hearings or has information that would not be available to a jury, like a coconspirator’s 
confession or evidence presented at a suppression hearing). 
 433.  See Mary V. Dobson, The Juvenile Court and Parental Rights, 4 FAM. L.Q. 393, 402–03 
(1970) (noting that the judge may dispose of the case based on how well the child might 
do if released into the community). 
 434.  Cf. id. at 400 (noting that many juvenile systems “request that parents utilize com-
munity agencies” to help control a child who has been released into the community before 
trial). 
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is taking a turn for the worse, the court can change its detention deci-
sion.435 
6. Plea or Adjudication 
In juvenile court, at the guilt or innocence determination—
called a fact finding or an adjudication—the judge must determine 
whether the elements in the petition were proved beyond a reasona-
ble doubt.436  There is still room for the exercise of a great deal of dis-
cretion in this ostensibly straightforward and discrete task.437 
Several facets of juvenile court practice conspire to imperil the 
integrity of the judge’s verdict at the fact finding.  First, the fact that, 
in most jurisdictions, the judge has an obligation to serve the child’s 
“best interests”438 can compromise the judge’s role as the fact finder, 
as the judge “may inappropriately lean in favor of conviction in order 
to ensure youths in need of rehabilitative services will receive them as 
a condition of probation or placement.”439  All the information to 
which the judge has been exposed, through pretrial litigation, co-
respondents’ hearings, and other sources might enable the judge to 
unconsciously fail to hold the government to the beyond the reasona-
ble doubt standard in its presentation of evidence,440 or observe the 
presumption of innocence less scrupulously, because the judge is less 
receptive to listening to defense counsel’s counterarguments.441 
Second, familiarity breeds possible contravention of youths’ 
rights at trial.  The familiarity threatens to corrupt the verdict in at 
least two ways.  First, judges, who hear literally hundreds of cases each 
                                                        
 435.  See id. at 399–403 (stating that the child may be released to his parents if it appears 
the parents can control the child, but that if the child does not respond well to being in 
the community the probation officer will take this into account in a report to the court). 
 436.  In re Winship, 379 U.S. 358, 368 (1970). 
 437.  See Feld, Principle of Offense, supra note 413, at 176 (noting that any time a judge is 
given a standard lacking in guidelines, such as the totality of the circumstances test, it re-
sults in virtually unlimited judicial discretion). 
 438.  Cf. Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 191, at 569–70 (arguing that “[j]udges who 
conduct . . . delinquency cases . . . may over-convict in close cases out of a misguided no-
tion that the best way to protect the community . . . is to err on the side of conviction”). 
 439.  Id. at 570. 
 440.  See id. at 564–67 (arguing that juvenile judges, when confronted with all the in-
formation available, frequently convict juveniles on very scant evidence). 
 441.  See Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 191, at 564–71 (discussing the kinds of cases 
in which juvenile judges convict youths on the scantest of evidence). 
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year, “may become less careful in weighing the evidence[,] . . . more 
cynical in evaluating the credibility of the juveniles who appear before 
them,”442 and more trusting of the police officers whose testimony 
they credit again and again.443  Second, the familiarity encourages a 
kind of informality that may allow for consideration of evidence that 
has no bearing on the determination of guilt or innocence,444 and a 
relaxation of the rules of evidence.445  And, since jury instructions of-
ten provide fecund grounds for appeal, and one of the efficiencies of 
bench trials is that judges do not instruct themselves on the record, 
juveniles tried without juries are forced to forfeit a common avenue 
for post-adjudication relief.446 
7.  Disposition 
With the most serious crimes culled from juvenile court, the pub-
lic perceives juvenile court sanctions as, at worst, a slap on the wrist, 
and at best, an opportunity for the state to provide a wayward child 
with needed services.447  The public’s perception is that the length of 
                                                        
 442.  Janet E. Ainsworth, The Court’s Effectiveness in Protecting the Rights of Juveniles in De-
linquency Cases, 6 JUVENILE COURT 64, 68 (1996), available at http://futureofchildren.org/ 
futureofchildren/publications/docs/06_03_04.pdf. 
 443.  See Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 191, at 574 (explaining that “judges who sit 
in a criminal or juvenile court for years come to know the police officers of the jurisdic-
tion.  If the judge knows that a particular officer is a ‘good cop’ and particularly if the 
judge has found that the officer testified truthfully in previous cases, the natural tendency 
is to presume that the officer would not lie.  As a result, the judge is less likely to subject 
the officer’s testimony to the kind of critical evaluation that would expose untruths.  In 
cases in which an officer’s testimony is contradicted by previous statements or other offic-
ers’ testimony, the judge is likely to presume that the inconsistency stems from a mistake 
or misunderstanding, rather than from fabrication.”). 
 444.  Miriam Stohs, Racism in the Juvenile Justice System: A Critical Perspective, 2 WHITTIER J. 
CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 97, 106 (2003); see also Birckhead, supra note 57. 
 445.  Stohs, supra note 444; Birckhead, supra note 57. 
 446.  Ainsworth, supra note 24, at 1125–26. 
 447.  Cf. PATRICIA PURITZ & CATHRYN CRAWFORD, NAT’L JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., 
FLORIDA: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN 
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY COURT 53 (2006), available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/Florida% 
20Assessment.pdf (stating that “[e]ven the senior staff and managers of some public de-
fender offices harbor thoughts that juvenile defenders are less than ‘real lawyers’ and view 
delinquency cases as ‘kiddie court.’”); GABRIELLA CELESTE & PATRICIA PURITZ, NAT’L 
JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., THE CHILDREN LEFT BEHIND: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO 
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exposure is generally shorter than exposure in criminal court, be-
cause in most jurisdictions, a youth cannot be under the court’s su-
pervision past the upper age of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction.448  
The fact is that, in all but one state,449 sentencing in juvenile court is 
indeterminate, and can be extended by the court in the name of the 
youth’s rehabilitation, so that a youth often winds up serving a harsh-
er sentence than an adult convicted of the same offense.450  Another 
myth is that the nature of the exposure is also not as severe as the ex-
posure in criminal court, since, even if the youth is detained, the 
youth theoretically receives rehabilitative services, like education, 
drug treatment, vocational training, and health care.451  Studies doc-
ument that many juvenile system stakeholders involve youths in the 
system for the express purpose of getting troubled youths services that 
they would not otherwise be able to access in the community.452  The 
fact is that there is a severe shortage of services available for system-
                                                        
COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN LOUISIANA 58 (2001), available at 
http://www.njdc.info/pdf/LAreport.pdf (stating that “[a] misguided perception contin-
ues to fester in the legal community that defending delinquent youth is for inexperienced 
and/or lazy lawyers who are not ‘real’ criminal defense attorneys”).   
 448.  See Francis T. Cullen et al., Public Opinion About Punishment and Corrections, 27 
CRIME & JUST. 1, 54 (2000) (noting the public perception that the juvenile system is not 
tough enough on juvenile offenders). 
 449.  WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.0357 (2011) (setting out sentencing standards that must 
be used in the state of Washington, or, alternatively, providing for suspended disposition 
alternatives, chemical dependency disposition alternatives, or “manifest injustice”). 
 450.  In Gault, perhaps the most famous example, fifteen-year-old Gerald Gault was re-
moved from his home and detained in a group home for six years for making an obscene 
phone call; if he had been an adult, his sentence could not have exceeded sixty days incar-
ceration.  See supra Part II.A.3; Irene Marker Rosenberg, Leaving Bad Enough Alone: A Re-
sponse to the Juvenile Court Abolitionists, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 163, 169 n.34 (1993). 
 451.  See Cullen, supra note 448, at 54–55 (noting that the public perception is that ju-
veniles are treated “leniently” in the juvenile system). 
 452.  See, e.g., PATRICIA PURITZ & ROBIN WALKER STERLING, NAT’L JUVENILE DEFENDER 
CTR., WEST VIRGINIA: ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF 
REPRESENTATION 61 (2010), available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/West_Virginia_ 
Assessment.pdf (“For some children, involvement in the juvenile justice system is the only 
way the family can access services.”); JESSIE BECK, PATRICIA PURITZ & ROBIN WALKER 
STERLING, NAT’L JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., NEBRASKA: A STUDY OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 
COURT 67 (2009), available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/nebraska_assessment.pdf (ex-
plaining that “families often come to the county attorney’s office” and ask that charges be 
filed against the child “so that the youth can receive services”).  
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involved youths, whether they are placed in the community or in a de-
tention facility.453  As several commentators have documented, the col-
lateral consequences for juvenile court involvement can have a pro-
found and enduring impact on the lives of system-involved youth.454 
8.  Society’s Misperception of Juvenile Court 
Two popular misperceptions of juvenile court allow discretion to 
flourish unchecked.  The first misconception is that any given state’s 
juvenile court system, from its juvenile code to its dispositions, is 
geared primarily to support the rehabilitation of a system-involved 
youth.455  While this was perhaps true in the first decades of juvenile 
court’s existence, as of 1997, seventeen states had changed the pur-
pose clauses of their juvenile codes to incorporate goals of punish-
ment, accountability, and public safety—goals traditionally reserved 
for the criminal justice system.456  And “[a]lthough many jurisdictions 
still retain language suggesting rehabilitation as a goal, only three 
states emphasize the best interests of the child as the primary purpose 
of the juvenile court.”457 
The second misperception, a corollary to the first, is that because 
the primary goal of juvenile court is rehabilitation, juvenile court is 
low-stakes court, the junior varsity to the adult criminal court’s varsity 
league.458  The most serious cases are often transferred for prosecu-
                                                        
 453.  See BECK, PURITZ, WALKER STERLING, supra note 452, at 68 (explaining that middle 
class families in the community cannot afford services, like insurance, for their childen); 
see also Mark Soler, Health Issues for Adolescents in the Justice System, 31 J. ADOLESCENT 
HEALTH 321, 321, 324 (2002) (describing the “endemic” problem of overcrowding and 
lack of youth resources in the juvenile justice system). 
 454.  See, e.g., In re Richard A., 946 A.2d 204, 212–14 (R.I. 2008) (discussing the impacts 
of requiring juveniles to register as sex-offenders).  
 455.  But see Cullen, supra note 448, at 54–55 (noting the trend in the juvenile court sys-
tem to “get tough” on juvenile offenders charged with violent crimes, and concluding that 
punishment has also been integral to the corrections system). 
 456.  See Purpose Clause, NAT’L CENTER FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, http://www.ncjj.org/ 
Topic/Purpose-Clause.aspx (last visited Mar. 22, 2012) (excerpting various states’ purpose 
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nois, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania, 
Washington, and Wisconsin). 
 457.  Katherine Hunt Federle, Blended Sentencing and the Sixth Amendment, 11 A.B.A. 
CHILD. RIGHTS LITIG. COMMITTEE NEWSLETTER, Summer 2009. 
 458.  See supra note 405 and accompanying text. 
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tion in adult criminal court, so the cases that remain to be processed 
in juvenile court are mostly petty offenses, like assault or disorderly 
conduct cases from schoolyard fights, marijuana drug possession cas-
es, and petty theft charges.459 
C.  Modern-Day Juvenile Court Case Study 
Malcolm Smith,460 a fifteen-year-old African-American boy, is 
charged in juvenile court with one count of assault with a dangerous 
weapon, and one count of misdemeanor disorderly conduct.  The al-
legations are that Malcolm had a fight with a boy at school after that 
boy started a disrespectful rumor about a girl who was Malcolm’s 
friend.  There is a physical altercation involving several boys on each 
side, during which Malcolm is alleged to have kicked the other boy.  
When the police arrive on the scene, Malcolm is arrested and ques-
tioned, and gives a statement to police that he “just got mad,” that the 
boy “didn’t have to say anything about [his] friend” who had lived 
next door to him since he was very young and was “like a play sister,” 
and that “he should know that he shouldn’t disrespect females.”  Us-
ing their discretion at arrest, the police hold him in juvenile deten-
tion based on several factors, including Malcolm’s crime and his yell-
ing at the scene, which are perceived by the police as indications that 
Malcolm has anger management problems and represents a danger to 
the community; his prior court history; and the fact that, when the po-
lice called Malcolm’s home, they could not locate his mother, who 
was not at home at the time. 
The prosecutor charges the case as assault with a dangerous 
weapon, listing the weapon as Malcolm’s shoe.  Because of Malcolm’s 
prior offense history, the prosecutor goes forward with Malcolm’s 
case.  Malcolm has a prior history of two misdemeanor juvenile arrests 
for disorderly conduct at school: one for wearing the wrong school 
                                                        
 459.  See PATRICK GRIFFIN ET AL., OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY 
PREVENTION, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIM: NATIONAL REPORT 
SERIES: TRYING JUVENILES AS ADULTS: AN ANALYSIS OF STATE TRANSFER LAWS AND 
REPORTING 6–10 (2011), available at http://www.ncjj.org/pdf/Transfer_232434.pdf 
(providing examples of what kinds of juvenile cases are transferred in different states). 
 460.  This is an amalgam of juvenile cases that the author handled during the five years 
that she represented indigent youth as a defense attorney, and studied during the four 
years that she helped assess the juvenile indigent defense systems of several different states 
for the National Juvenile Defender Center.  This is an “every case,” and does not represent 
any specific client, client’s family, judge, prosecutor, probation officer, police officer, or 
jurisdiction. 
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uniform, and the other for getting into a shouting match with a 
member of a rival basketball team after a recent game.  He also has a 
previous adjudication for one count of unauthorized use of a vehicle 
as a passenger (also known as joyriding).  The prosecutor can see 
from Malcolm’s court record that, although the police department 
has a diversion program for first-time joyriding offenders, the police 
department made the decision not to divert Malcolm’s case. 
Early that morning, at the juvenile lockup at the courthouse, a 
juvenile supervision officer interviews Malcolm.  The probation of-
ficer notes her impressions of Malcolm as “hostile” and “needing strict 
supervision.” 
The next morning, the detention hearing judge, who will later 
preside over Malcolm’s trial, reads the police report, which includes 
Malcolm’s statement.  At the detention hearing, the judge releases 
Malcolm pending trial with an admonishment that the judge is ex-
pecting Malcolm to comply with the court-ordered release conditions, 
which include attending school, obeying his mother, and staying at 
least 100 yards away from the boy he allegedly kicked at all times. 
Between the detention hearing and trial, Malcolm’s judge han-
dled matters related to Malcolm’s case two additional times.  The first 
time, the judge held a hearing at which Malcolm’s probation officer 
moved to have Malcolm’s release condition changed to detention in a 
youth shelter home, because Malcolm was not complying with his re-
lease conditions.  The trial court judge placed Malcolm in a group 
home.  The second time the judge considered Malcolm’s case was 
when the co-respondent pleaded guilty. 
On the day of trial, Malcolm’s mother is allowed into the court-
room; his pastor, coach, and friends from school are not.  At the pre-
trial motions hearing concerning suppression of Malcolm’s statement, 
which is incorporated into Malcolm’s trial, the judge finds the arrest-
ing officer credible, and deems the statement admissible.461  At trial, 
the complaining witness testifies that he did not know Malcolm per-
                                                        
 461.  Many jurisdictions allow incorporation of the pretrial suppression hearing testi-
mony and the trial testimony in bench trials, on the theory that trial court judges can do 
the “mental gymnastics” necessary to consider, but not be unduly influenced by, inadmis-
sible evidence.  See, e.g., United States v. Abanatha, 999 F.2d 1246, 1250 (8th Cir. 1993) 
(“Someone has to decide what facts to consider and what facts to ignore.  We trust that 
decision-making responsibility to the trial judge.  Sometimes this responsibility requires 
difficult mental gymnastics—as in a bench trial where the judge decides both what facts to 
admit into evidence and how to weigh that evidence—but trial judges manage such feats of 
objectivity all the time.”). 
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sonally though he had seen Malcolm around school, that Malcolm 
yelled at him about starting a rumor about his friend, and that he was 
“75% sure” that Malcolm was the one who kicked him, even though 
he was curled up in a ball on the ground, and there were other boys 
involved.  The judge denies defense counsel’s motion for a judgment 
of acquittal. 
The defense does not put on any witnesses.  Instead, the defense 
argues, in accordance with Malcolm’s statement—which the judge 
had admitted into evidence after the suppression hearing—that alt-
hough Malcolm got angry, the co-defendant, and not Malcolm, 
kicked the boy.  Juvenile defense counsel argues that there is no eye-
witness testimony showing Malcolm kicked the complainant, and that 
Malcolm’s behavior after the police were called is completely con-
sistent with innocence. 
The judge finds Malcolm delinquent of assault with a dangerous 
weapon, a felony, and misdemeanor disorderly conduct.  The court 
rules that it found the state’s two witnesses credible, and that the 
court believes Malcolm was very angry, so it was “reasonable to infer,” 
from his statement that Malcolm kicked the boy, though the court did 
have “a doubt because no one testified that they actually saw him kick 
the complainant.”  The court then goes on to lecture Malcolm, saying, 
“I know you feel protective of your friend, but that’s no excuse to start 
a fight.  You and your brother have both been in trouble enough to 
know better.”  When Malcolm started to speak up and say that he did 
not kick the boy, the judge interrupted him, saying “you had your 
chance, now it’s my turn.  I’ve found that you committed this assault, 
so, according to the law, you did it.”  Malcolm stands and silently cries 
through the rest of the hearing. Outside the courtroom, he tells his 
attorney, “the judge just could not see that I didn’t do it.  He just 
couldn’t see it.” 
The salient themes in this typical modern day narrative take on a 
stark meaning in light of the social and legal histories of juvenile 
court jurisprudence.  Social control, lack of parental empowerment, 
reservation of resources for other children, and the presumption of 
criminality all have deep roots in the juvenile court’s historical treat-
ment of black children. 
At first blush, it might seem that overruling Gault and applying a 
model of constitutional jurisprudence built on Bill of Rights protec-
tions in juvenile court proceedings would not address juvenile courts’ 
deficiencies.462  But the jurisprudential reach of Gault, as the case that 
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created the modern-day juvenile court system, extends far beyond its 
practical effects.463 Like other landmark Supreme Court decisions, 
such as Plessy v. Ferguson,464 Gideon v. Wainwright,465 Brown v. Board of 
Education,466 Bowers v. Hardwick,467 and McCleskey v. Kemp,468 the Su-
preme Court’s opinion in Gault is more than a simple pronounce-
ment of jurisprudential rules of decision for specific issues.  It trans-
cends its circumscribed holdings to stand as a prototype of ideals 
regarding how the juvenile justice system should run and what cultur-
al values the system will reflect.469  This prototype affects how all of the 
players in the system view their goals and roles, duties and limitations; 
and it affects what the public and the public’s legislative and adminis-
trative representatives think that the system should be about.470  
Gault’s great failing is that it erects a deficient prototype.471  Replacing 
that prototype with a better one will not itself cure juvenile court’s de-
ficiencies, but it will create an institutional environment in which a 
wide range of players can work more effectively toward a wide range 
of cures for many of the problems. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The relationship between the history of the treatment of system-
involved black children and the doctrine that evolved because of the 
Court’s omission of that history lays bare several important realiza-
tions.472  The first is that the absence of one narrative can have as 
much of an impact as inclusion of another narrative.473  This kind of 
narrative privileging led to the Court’s failure to recognize the poten-
tial for civil rights reforms in juvenile court in In re Gault, and instead 
focus on the admittedly rehabilitative, informal nature of juvenile 
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court allowed the Court to continue to sidestep that narrative aside in 
McKeiver—even though McKeiver presented the Burrus narrative for 
the Court’s fair consideration.474 
The second is that the history and the doctrine collude to per-
petuate the problem of disproportionate minority contact in the ju-
venile system.475 Interlocked in the cells of the juvenile justice sys-
tem—like complimentary strands of DNA—each makes its own 
contributions to modern-day disproportionate minority contact.476  
The history contributes the weight of decades of stereotypes and bias; 
the doctrine contributes pockets of discretion, like the guise of “best 
interests,” making youths vulnerable to exploitation by these stereo-
types and bias.477  Neither, standing alone, is the cause.  The result is a 
seemingly intractable, systemic problem that has no head and no tail, 
so it is unclear where to strike first. 
Accordingly, augmenting Gault’s protections with a case that ex-
tends the Bill of Rights to juvenile court—the way the Court aug-
mented Powell with its decision in Gideon—as this Article suggests, is 
only part of the solution.478  After all, black adults are overrepresented 
in the criminal justice system, and they enjoy the due process protec-
tions of the Bill of Rights.479  But, cultural solutions that address the 
historical dimension of disproportionate minority contact can and 
must be undertaken as well.480 
The third is that examining the evolution of the doctrine, in light 
of the overlooked history, is a methodology that has implications be-
yond the jury trial question in juvenile court.  This methodology is, in 
effect, a look at the flip side of interest convergence,481 and it links ju-
venile justice to other social movements in which the experience of a 
subset of an oppressed group are subsumed by the narrative of the 
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dominant voice in the group.482  If the needs of the subsumed group 
(here, black system-involved children) are not taken into account dur-
ing the reform period, there is a risk that the subsumed group will not 
profit from the jurisprudential, social, and other gains the way the 
dominant group (white system-involved children) might.483  While the 
“children are different” argument is being so prominently used to ar-
gue the severity of penalties for juveniles tried as adults for very seri-
ous crimes, it is important to remember that when the Child Savers 
championed their version of the “children are different” argument, 
they did not mean black children.484 
The fact is that it feels as though the juvenile justice system has 
taken on a life of its own, evolving into more than the sum of the mil-
lions of prosecutors, judges, defense attorneys, and probation officers 
who make up its parts, and accomplish with almost unassailable effi-
ciency the kind of disparate treatment that would have made Gover-
nor George Wallace proud.  This situation could not be so unless the 
law allows it to be so; this situation could not be so unless the culture 
allows it to be so.  This methodology allows full consideration of both 
why and how this phenomenon has come about, and development of 
a complete solution to address it. 
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